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I. PREFACE
T ODAY, our courts are clogged with cases in which claimants al-
lege injuries caused by exposure to a toxic substance. Cases of
this nature have sometimes been referred to as toxic torts.' In 1983
Villanova Law School presented a Symposium on Toxic Torts. At
this Symposium, one of the authors of this article presented a sum-
mary of the legal arguments that have been effective in the defense of
toxic tort cases.2 That presentation formed the basis for this paper.
The primary emphasis of this article will be the defenses avail-
able in asbestos litigation. 3 The article focuses upon asbestos litiga-
tion for two reasons. First, while there has been toxic tort litigation
prior to the onset of asbestos-related litigation, the recent deluge of
asbestos-related injury claims, 4 coupled with the subsequent downfall
1. The term "toxic torts," for purposes of this article, refers to personal injury
claims that arise out of exposure to a toxic substance and which affect thousands,
perhaps even millions, of people. Even if one excludes the various occupational dis-
eases contracted by industrial employees such as silicosis, anthrocosis, and asbestosis,
there has still been considerable toxic tort litigation arising out of the sale and use of
pharmaceuticals and chemicals. For example, over 500 lawsuits alleging injuries
caused by the drug MER/29 were filed during the mid-1960's. See, e.g., Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). More recently, there have
been over 1000 suits filed claiming injuries due to in utero exposure to DES (diethyl-
stilbesterol). See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). There are potentially 50,000 plaintiffs who could become
involved in the "agent orange" litigation. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Li-
tig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (certifying all Vietnam War veterans, their
families, and survivors as potential plaintiffs in the class action suit against manufac-
turers of "agent orange," a defoilant used in the Vietnam War). For a further discus-
sion of the potential magnitude of toxic torts litigation, see Podgers, Toxic Time
Bombs-Say Latent Disease Suits Will Be Key Battleground in '80s, 67 A.B.A. J. 139
(1981).
2. The authors have spent approximately five years in defending the Manville
Corporation in Pennsylvania and federal courts. It is the authors' intention in this
article to demonstrate those strategies and legal approaches that have been successful
in the actual trial setting, rather than to provide an overall evaluation of the legal
principles each side uses in its case. The fact that the authors have chosen to address
toxic torts within this context does not suggest that they believe the litigation/tort
context is the best or the only means of handling such claims. On the contrary, much
research has been done which suggests that an administrative system, similar to the
Workmen's Compensation scheme, would be the best system for resolving toxic tort
claims. That topic is, however, beyond the scope of this paper, and has therefore not
been discussed in any detail. For a discussion of the advantages of a legislative solu-
tion to the toxic tort problem, see Schwartz & Means, The Need For Federal Product
Liabii'ty and Toxic Tort Legislation. A Current Assessment, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1088 (1983).
3. The authors have focused on asbestos litigation for purposes of discussing the
defense of toxic tort claims because they believe that the procedures and tactics de-
veloped for resolving asbestos claims may well be used to handle future toxic tort
claims. See also Phillips, Asbestos Litigation: The Test of the Tort System, 36 ARK. L.
REV. 343 (1982).
4. Through 1980, a total of approximately 25,000 asbestos-related disease law-
suits had been filed in the United States, and that number is expected to grow. Podg-
1982-1983] 1209
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of Johns-Manville Corporation, 5 suggests that this area of litigation
merits discussion. Secondly, tlhe complexity and sheer volume of as-
bestos-related disease litigation provides practitioners with a fund of
knowledge that can be readily applied to other types of toxic tort
litigation.6 This article, therefore, attempts to apply the trial proce-
dures and tactics of asbestos litigation to the field of toxic torts gener-
ally. To this end, the article will discuss the appropriateness and
effectiveness of asbestos-related defenses vis-a-vis other toxic tort
claims.
II. INTRODUCTION
The toxic tort decisional law is replete with references to esoteric
defenses created, or at least recognized by, contemporary tort law. 7
Without denigrating such imaginative defenses, the best approach for
any trial lawyer is to determine at the outset which defenses will gen-
erally be successful and those which will not be successful. This ap-
proach is especially recommended in the toxic tort context, where
hundreds of lawsuits may be filed and where a defendant must exer-
cise some selectivity in deciding which cases to try. In making such
determinations, the practitioner must keep in mind that many typical
products liability defenses, while logically and legally sound, are gen-
erally ineffective in the toxic tort area because the jury either will fail
ers, supra note 1, at 139-42. See also, Olick, Chapter I--A Dubious Solution to Massive
Toxic Tort Liability, 18 FORUM 361 (1982).
5. On August 26, 1982, Johns-Manville Corporation and its affiliated companies
filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.
At the time it filed this petition, Johns-Manville was a defendant in approximately
16,000 asbestos-related disease suits. Since the filing of the petition, Johns-Manville
has not been named in any additional asbestos-related disease lawsuits. See An Asbes-
tos Bankruptcy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1982, at 54; Manville's Bold Maneuver, TIME, Sept.
6, 1982, at 17.
6. During the course of this article, reference frequently will be made to Penn-
sylvania law. This has been done because of the authors' familiarity with Penn-
sylvania law and because Pennsylvania law amply demonstrates the practical and
legal difficulties inherent in defending toxic tort claims. Moreover, the use of one
jurisdiction's law in explaining the defense of toxic tort claims lends a thread of con-
sistency to the discussion of the defenses available to a defendant in the toxic tort
area.
7. The term "esoteric defenses," for the purposes of this article, means typical
products liability defenses such as contributory negligence, assumption of the risk,
and superseding cause. While these defenses still exist theoretically in toxic tort liti-
gation, they have little value to the practitioner because of the way courts have inter-
preted these defenses when they are used in a toxic tort case. For additional
discussion of these defenses in practice, see notes 9 & 179-97 and accompanying text
i~lra.
1210 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
3
Goggin and Brophy: Toxic Torts: Workable Defenses Available to the Corporate Defenda
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
Toxic TORTS
to understand their nuances or, more likely, will feel that the defense
proffered is "technical lawyer talk."
Initially it must be observed that the defense of a personal injury
case in any modern courtroom is difficult for a defendant, even given
the best factual scenario. Today, a plaintiff finds himself with an
ever-expanding number of liability theories and additional bases of
recovery," while a defendant finds himself with disappearing or lim-
8. A plaintiff in a toxic tort case can utilize strict liability, concert of action,
industry-wide liability, and market-share liability theories to press a claim for com-
pensatory damages against a defendant for injuries from exposure to a toxic sub-
stance. For example, in the 1966 case of Webb v. Zem, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court adopted the doctrine of strict liability as set forth in the Second Restatement of
Torts, § 402A. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). Section 402A of the
Restatement reads as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See generally, Snyman, The Evolu-
lion of the Doctrine of Strict Products Liability in the United States, 11 ANGLO-AM. L. REV.
241 (1982).
In 1979, the Court of Appeals of Michigan, in the case ofAbe/v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
allowed plaintiffs to recover for injuries caused by DES on a "concert of action"
theory. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979). In Abel,
the plaintiffs were allowed to recover against all the manufacturers of DES, even
though they were unable to identify the particular manufacturer whose product in-
jured them. Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 24. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted
that "[ilt is well-established that if two or more persons engaged negligently in a
concerted activity, and as a result plaintiff is injured, all are liable even though only
one directly caused the injury." Id. The legal principle of a concert-of-action theory
is articulated in § 876 of the Second Restatement of Torts:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he [a] does a tortious act in concert with the
other or pursuant to a common design with him, or [b] knows the other's
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or en-
couragement. to the other to so conduct himself, or [c] gives substantial
assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own con-
duct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). See generally, LaMarca, Market
Share Liability, Industry- Wide Liabiity, Alternative Liability and Concert of Action.- Modem
Legal Concepts Preserving Liability for Defective but Unidentifable Products, 31 DRAKE L.
REV. 61, 65-68 (1981-82); ProsserJoint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV.
413, 429-30 (1937); Sheiner, DES and a Proposed Theoy of Enterprise Liabil'ty, 46 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 963, 978-95 (1978).
The industry-wide theory of liability was utilized in the 1972 case of Hall v. ElZ
Du Pont de Nenours & Co. to permit a plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained when a
12111982-19831
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ited defenses. 9 Furthermore, once a toxic tort defendant loses on the
issue of liability, he is faced with methods of calculating damages
that, as a practical matter, may double or triple the amount of a
plaintiffs recovery.10 Additionally, in Pennsylvania, a defendant who
has judgment entered against him for an amount that is more than
125% of the dollar amount that he offered prior to trial in settlement
blasting cap exploded. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972). Under this theory, the plaintiff had to prove that there was a high
probability that one of the named defendants caused his injury; that he was unable
to identify the particular defendant; and that all defendants concertedly held to an
unsafe or unreasonable safety standard in manufacturing the product which caused
the injury. See id. For further discussion of the enterprise theory of liability, see notes
81-83 and accompanying text infra. See also Gillick, The Essence of Enterprise Liabilty,
Or the True Meaning of "We're All in This Together," 16 FORUM 979, 980-83 (1981);
LaMarca, supra, at 69-72; Mallor, Guilt by Indust: Industty- Wide Liabilty for Defective
Products, 49 TENN. L. REV. 61, 72-77 (1981); Schoenfeld, Industi- WideJoint Liabilt,
57 MARQ. L. REV. 675 (1974); Comment, DES anda Proposed Theoty of Enterprise Ltabil-
ity, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 995-1007 (1978).
In 1980, in the case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the California Supreme Court
adopted the theory of "market share" liability, under which the plaintiffs were per-
mitted to recover damages for injuries caused by DES without identifying the partic-
ular defendant whose product caused their injuries. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1980). The plaintiffs had to prove
the difficulty of identifying the manufacturer; that each manufacturer had produced
the identical product which caused the injury; and that the manufacturers joined
represented a substantial portion of all producers in the plaintiffs' area at the time of
exposure. Id See generally Gillick, supra, at 986-87; LaMarca, supra, at 89-93; Mallor,
supra, at 89-93; Comment, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Prob-
lem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1981).
9. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(abolishing the state-of-the-art defense in strict liability cases); Rutter v. Northeastern
Beaver County School Dist., 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198 (1981) (abolishing assump-
tion of the risk as a defense to negligence actions).
In Rutter a divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the defense of as-
sumption of the risk in negligence causes of action; the defense was held to be viable
only where preserved by statute, in cases of express assumption of the risk, and in
cases brought under a strict liability theory. Rutter, 496 Pa. at 613, 437 A.2d at 1209.
The court was divided four to three, with at least two justices advocating retention of
the defense which Justice Nix termed "a necessary and viable component of tort
law." Id. at 617, 437 A.2d at 1212 (Nix, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of
Rutter, see note 193 inra. Assumption of the risk is still a defense to a strict liability
claim under Pennsylvania law, with the operative question being whether the plain-
tiff was in fact aware of the risk, not whether he reasonably should have been aware
of it. Christner v. E.W. Bliss Co., 524 F. Supp. 1122 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
In Beshaa, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that neither the defendant man-
ufacturer's unawareness of the dangers of exposure to asbestos, nor the scientific
unknowability of those dangers at the time of the plaintiffs exposure provided a
defense to a strict liability claim for asbestos-related diseases. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 191,
447 A.2d at 539.
10. In addition to compensatory damages for personal injuries, other bases of
recovery are now available to plaintiffs. In 1979, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
expanded liability for infliction of emotional distress. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404
A.2d 672 (1979). Once limited to those persons in the "zone of physical danger" the
Sinn court expanded liability to permit recovery by a bystander who was not in phys-
ical danger, but whose mental distress was immediate and foreseeable. Id See also
1212 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
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of the case will find himself obligated to pay the plaintiff a premium
of ten percent per year for having litigated the matter."
Comment, Refmiig the Traditional Theories of Recoveg for Consumer Mental Anguish, 1979
B.Y.U. L. REV. 81.
Pennsylvania also adopted § 908 of the Second Restatement of Torts regarding
recovery of punitive damages. See Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d
355 (1963) (adopting the language of § 908 of the Second Restatement of Torts and
holding that punitive damages were recoverable against a defendant in an assault
and battery action if defendant's conduct were "malicious, wanton, reckless or op-
pressive"). Section 908 of the Second Restatement reads as follows:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal
damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous con-
duct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, be-
cause of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights
of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly con-
sider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm
to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the
wealth of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). In the context of toxic tort litiga-
tion, evaluation of the "outrageousness" of asbestos-manufacturers' conduct has fo-
cused on their alleged knowledge of the hazards associated with exposure to asbestos
and their failure to warn workers of these dangers despite this knowledge. See, e.g.,
Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357, 374-78 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See also,
Fulton, Punitive Damages in Product Liabiity Cases, 15 FORUM 117 (1979); Nelson, Pun-
ishment for Profit.- An Examination of the Punitive Damage Award in Strict Liabil'ty, 18 Fo-
RUM 377 (1982); Parnell, Manufacturers of Toxic Substances.- Tort Liability and Punitive
Damages, 17 FORUM 947 (1981); Comment, Exemplaty Damages in Products Liability
Cases, 1980 DET. C.L. REV. 647.
In addition, some jurisdictions allow recovery for various types of economic
losses incurred due to a defective product, including the following: damage to the
defective product itself; costs of repairing the defective product; resulting costs of
taking the product out of service to repair it; and the losses suffered because the
defect renders the product worth less than its cost. See Cane, Physical Loss, Economic
Loss and Products Liability, 95 LAW Q. REv. 117 (1979).
In the 1980 case of Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
adopted the "total offset" method for calculating future damages. Kaczkowski v.
Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980) (in awarding damages for lost earnings
in a wrongful death action, future interest shall be presumed to offset future inflation
totally and the practice of discounting future lost earnings is abandoned). Under the
"total offset" formula, future interest rates are presumed to equal future inflation
rates; thus the two factors offset one another in the calculation of damages. Id. at
583, 421 A.2d at 1038-39. Under this system, a damage award for lost earnings is not
discounted to its present value so that the plaintiff's recovery is greater than it would
have been under the discounting method.
11. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 238 (Purdon 1983). Rule 238 of the Penn-
sylvania Rules of Civil Procedure reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (e), in an action seeking mone-
tary relief for bodily injury, death or property damage, or any combination
thereof, the court or the arbitrators appointed under the Arbitration Act of
June 16, 1836, P.L. 715, as amended, 5 P.S. § 30 et seq., or the Health Care
Services Malpractice Act of October 15, 1975, P.L. 390, 40 P.S. § 1301.101
et seq., shall
(1) add to the amount of compensatory damages in the award of
the arbitrators, in the verdict of a jury, or in the court's decision in a
6
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In toxic tort/products liability litigation, the societal context in
which the defense attorney must present his case frequently will also
be inherently unfavorable. A defense attorney often will find himself
portrayed as "representing" a Fortune 500 monolith in a contest
which pits him against an individual plaintiff, presented as a hard-
working, church-going family man, a loving husband and father.
Moreover, in toxic tort cases, the plaintiff is often seriously injured or
threatened with a catastrophic illness. Skillful plaintiffs' attorneys ex-
ploit this factual scenario to the fullest advantage. In fact, a clever
plaintiffs' attorney will increase the jury's empathy for his client in
direct proportion to a defendant's assent up the Fortune 500 ladder.
The defendant in a products liability or toxic tort contest will
also find himself confronted on a regular basis with adverse publicity.
For example, in asbestos litigation, nearly all jurors have been ex-
posed to stories in the newspapers, news magazines, or to programs
shown on television, suggesting that the asbestos industry knew of the
dangers of asbestos since the 1930's, but failed to warn the public and
even attempted to conceal the dangers.' 2 Even if a defendant is in-
volved in a toxic tort case which has received little pre-trial publicity,
he may still find himself facing a jury which has been tainted by gen-
eral exposure to news articles about toxic substances. Consequently,
many practicing defense attorneys take their most aggressive trial po-
nonjury trial, damages for delay at ten (10) percent per annum, not
compounded, which shall become part of the award, verdict or deci-
sion;
(2) compute the damages for delay from the date the plaintiff
filed the initial complaint in the action or from a date one year after
the accrual of the cause of action, whichever is later, up to the date of
the award, verdict or decision.
(b) In arbitration under the Act of 1836, the amount of damages for
delay shall not be included in determining whether the amount in contro-
versy is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.
(c) Except as provided in subdivision (e), damages for delay shall be
added to the award, verdict or decision against all defendants found liable,
no matter when joined in the action.
(d) The court may, and on request of a party shall, charge the jury
that if it finds for the plaintiff, it shall not award the plaintiff any damages
for delay because this is a matter for the court.
(e) If a defendant at any time prior to trial makes a written offer of
settlement in a specified sum with prompt cash payment to the plaintiff,
and continues that offer in effect until commencement of trial, but the offer
is not accepted and the plaintiff does not recover by award, verdict or deci-
sion, exclusive of damages for delay, more than 125 percent of the offer, the
court or the arbitrators shall not award damages for delay for the period
after the date the offer was made.
Id.
12. See, e.g., An Asbestos Bankruptcy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1982, at 54; Manvlle's
Bold Maneuver, TIME, Sept. 6, 1982, at 17.
1214 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
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sition during jury selection because it is so important to weed out
those jurors who have preconceived biases against corporate defend-
ants. In toxic tort suits, jury selection-especially in multi-defendant
cases-can easily require the same painstaking evaluation found in
highly publicized criminal matters. 3
Another major problem facing defense attorneys in toxic tort liti-
gation is the pattern jury instructions given at the end of a trial. In
these instructions, the manufacturer typically may be referred to as
the guarantor of his products. 14 Similarly, ajury instruction on strict
liability usually states that the risk of loss is placed on the seller with-
out regard to his fault. 15 In other situations, a jury may be instructed
that a product "lacking any element to make it safe" is defective.16
Or, a jury may be instructed that it may find liability if the defend-
13. It is not at all unusual for the process of jury selection in asbestos cases to last
several days. The authors can recall two such cases in which jury selection took
nearly a week. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa.
1982); Kostiuk v. Carey Canadian Mines, C.P. Phila. Cty., March Term, 1978, No.
3889. For a general discussion of the difficult process of jury selection in products
liability cases, see PerlmanJury Selection in the Products Case. Is the Appearance ofustice
the Goal?, TRIAL, Nov. 1982, at 59.
14. See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974)
(the lack of horizontal privity did not bar an employee's suit for breach of warranty
against a manufacturer of a steam boiler purchased by his employer). The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court, in refusing to require horizontal privity between the con-
sumer and manufacturer in order to sustain a breach of warranty cause of action, has
held that, "a manufacturer by virtue of section 402A [of the Second Restatement of
Torts] is effectively the guarantor of his products' safety." Id. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907.
The court reasoned that "[b]ecause the manufacturer is now a guarantor, a 'harsh
and unjust result' is worked on the plaintiff who may recover for his injury or loss if
his complaint is in trespass, but on identical facts would be denied relief if the plead-
ing is captioned 'Complaint in Assumpsit.' " Id. For reasons of "public policy" and
"legal symmetry," the court allowed the plaintiff's warranty claim, even though he
was not in privity of contract with the manufacturer. Id. at 33, 319 A.2d at 908.
15. See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). In
Azzarelo, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the use of the phrase "unreason-
ably dangerous" in the charge to a jury on a strict liability claim was reversible error;
the determination of whether or not a product was "unreasonably dangerous" within
the meaning of § 402A of the Restatement was a question of law for the court, to be
decided on the basis of policy factors involved in shifting the risk of loss to the manu-
facturer. See id. at 556-60, 391 A.2d at 1025-27. In outlining the policy rationale
behind allowing strict liability in the first place, the court pointed to the need for
consumer protection in this era of "giant corporate structures" and mass marketing.
The court also observed that "[clourts have increasingly adopted the position that the
risk of loss must be placed upon the supplier of the defective product without regard
to fault or privity of contract." Id. at 553, 391 A.2d at 1024 (footnote omitted). For a
further discussion of Azzarello, see notes 16 & 103 zhfra.
16. Azarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1978).
Once the court has made the determination that a shift in the risk of loss is appropri-
ate, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that "the jury may find a defect where the
product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its
intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use."
Id. (footnote omitted).
12151982-1983]
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ant's conduct was a "substantial factor in bringing about the plain-
tiff's injury."' 7 As these example illustrate, the jury instructions
themselves are worded in a manner designed to promote recovery.
Despite all of the difficulties which must be faced by defense
counsel in toxic tort litigation, victories by the defense are obtained
through a variety of legal and factual techniques. The remainder of
this paper will set forth the legal defenses and procedural techniques
that have provided the greatest success in the defense of asbestos-re-
lated disease cases.
III. THE OBVIOUS DEFENSES
A. Statute of Limitattons
The one defense that has been most successful in asbestos litiga-
tion, perhaps because there are so few other defenses available,18 is
the statute of limitations. 19 Essentially, a statute of limitations sets
forth a period of time within which an injured party must bring his
17. PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 3.25
(1981). One such jury instruction reads as follows:
In order for the plaintiff to recover in this case, the defendant's (negli-
gent) (reckless) (intentional) conduct must have been a substantial factor in
bringing about the accident. This is what the law recognizes as legal cause.
A substantial factor is an actual, real factor, although the result may be
unusual or unexpected, but it is not an imaginary or fanciful factor or a
factor having no connection or only an insignificant connection with the
accident.
Id.
See also id. § 6.30. Section 6.30 provides as follows:
The plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for all injuries which the de-
fendant's negligence was a substantial factor in producing. The defendant's
negligence need not be the sole cause of the injuries; other causes may have
contributed to producing the final result. The fact that some other factor
may have been a contributing cause of an injury does not relieve a defend-
ant of liability, unless you find that such other cause would have produced
the injury complained of independently of his negligence. [Even though
prior conditions or concurrent causes may have contributed to an injury, if
defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury, de-
fendant is liable for the full amount of damages sustained, without any ap-
portionment or diminution for the other conditions or causes.]
Id.
18. For a discussion of defenses which have been limited or abolished in the
products liability context, see note 9 and accompanying text supra.
19. For other discussions of the use of the statute of limitations as a defense, see
generally, Burch, A Practihoners Guide to the Statutes of Limitation in Products Liabil'iy
Suits, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 23 (1975); Dworkin, Products Liabilty ofthe 1980s." "Repose Is
Not the Destiny"of Manufacturers, 61 N.C.L. REV. 33 (1982); McGovern, The Status of
Statutes of Lbniations and Statutes of Repose in Product Liabihty Actions." Present and Future,
16 FORUM 416 (1980); Waldrip, Lmting Libabiity: Products Liability and a Statute of
Repose, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 137 (1980); Comment, The Statute of Limitations in Strict
Products Liablit'y Actions, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 477 (1975); Comment, When the Product
Ticks." Products Liability and Statutes of Limitations, 11 IND. L. REV. 693 (1978); Com-
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claim for damages. Almost every type of action at law has a statutory
time beyond which an action may not be brought. In Pennsylvania,
for example, the statute of limitations in an action for personal injury
is two years from the date that the plaintiff was injured.20 In most
actions for personal injuries, the statute of limitations is easy to apply
since there is no dispute regarding the date of injury. One might
consider the situation where a plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, is
injured in an automobile accident in downtown Philadelphia on June
1, 1980. This plaintiff, however, does not file a personal injury action
until July 1, 1982. Since more than two years have passed since the
date of the accident causing plaintiffs injuries, this plaintiff's claim is
barred by the Pennsylvania Statute of Limitations.
Fixing the date of injury in a toxic tort case may be more diffi-
cult, however. Generally, the plaintiff has not been injured traumati-
cally, but rather has been exposed to one or more toxic substances
over a long period of time. Moreover, the plaintiffs injury may not
have manifested itself until long after he has ceased being exposed to
the toxic substance. For example, a worker may have worked at the
Philadelphia Navy Yard from 1945 until 1955. Some years later, he
is advised that he is suffering from an asbestos-related disease, and he
brings an action against a number of asbestos manufacturers. He al-
leges that he was exposed to asbestos at the Navy Yard, that the expo-
ment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liabih'ty." The Assault Upon the Cladel of Strit Liabihly,
23 S.D.L. REv. 149 (1978).
20. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5502(a), 5524 (Purdon 1981). Under Penn-
sylvania law, the time within which a cause of action must be brought is "computed
* . . from the time the cause of action accrued, the criminal offense was committed,
or the right of appeal arose." Id. § 5502(a).
With regard to causes of action for personal injury, § 5524 provides as follows:
The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two
years:
(1) An action for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution or malicious abuse of process.
(2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for
the death of an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or
unlawful violence or negligence of another.
(3) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property,
including actions for specific recovery thereof.
(4) An action for waste or trespass of real property.
(5) An action upon a statute for a civil penalty or forfeiture.
(6) An action against any officer of any government unit for the
nonpayment of money or the nondelivery of property collected upon
on execution or otherwise in his possession.
(7) Any other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury
to person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or
otherwise tortious conduct or any other action or proceeding sounding
in trespass, including deceit or fraud, except an action or proceeding
subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter.
Id. § 5524.
12171982-1983]
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sure caused his disease, and that the defendants supplied asbestos
products to the Navy Yard during the time he worked there. The
defendants would then probably file a motion for summary judg-
ment, raising the statute of limitations. 2'
At first glance, the court in this situation has a number of op-
tions. It may rule that the statute of limitations began to run either
when the plaintiff was first exposed to asbestos, 22 or when the plaintiff
was last exposed to asbestos. 23 Under either of these applications of
21. Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, "any party may move for
summary judgment on the pleadings and any depositions, answers to interrogatories,
admissions on file and supporting affidavits." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1035(b)
(Purdon 1983). Summary judgment will be granted if the aforementioned docu-
ments reveal "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The bar of the statute
of limitations is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded as such by the defendant.
See Stein v. Richardson, 302 Pa. Super. 124, 448 A.2d 558 (1982). Where there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to the applicability of the statute of limitations to the
plaintiff's case, and where the reasonableness of the plaintiffis efforts to discover the
operable facts of his cause of action is not a close question, the court may rule as a
matter of law on when the statute commenced to run and may grant summary judg-
ment for the defendants. See Bickell v. Stein, 291 Pa. Super. 145, 435 A.2d 610
(1981). Ordinarily, however, where there is a genuine issue of fact as to the plaintiff's
diligence in discovering his injury-therefore an issue of fact as to when the statute
should commence to run-the defendant's motion for summary judgment must be
denied and the issue of fact submitted to the jury. See, e.g., Taylor v. Tukanowicz,
290 Pa. Super. 581, 435 A.2d 181 (1981).
22. See Birnbaum, First Breath's Last Gasp: The Discoveg Rule in Products Liability
Cases, 13 FORUM 279 (1977) (articulating the policy rationale behind the discovery
rule as opposed to the effects of the "first breath" rule, under which the cause of
action accrues at the moment the toxic substance is introduced into the plaintiffs
body). See also Note, Asbestos-Related Diseases Trigger Insurer's Duty to Defend and Indem-
nif When the Diseases Become Reasonably Capable of Diagnosis, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1335
(1983).
23. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Heydon Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188
N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963) (the statute of limitations in the plaintiff's negli-
gence claim commenced to run at the time the defendant's harmful product was
introduced into the plaintiffs body, not at the time the resulting harm was discov-
ered). In the Schwartz case, defendant's product, "Umbrathor," was inserted into the
plaintiff's sinuses to facilitate the taking of x-rays in 1944. In 1957, the plaintiff
discovered that he had cancer, allegedly as a result of his exposure to the defendant's
product which had remained in his body. In 1959, the plaintiff brought a cause of
action in negligence. Id. at 215, 188 N.E.2d at 143, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 715. The New
York Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiffs injury commenced at the moment
the harmful substance was introduced into his body. Since the injury occurred then,
the cause of action also accrued at that time and the plaintiffs claim in this case was
barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 216-19, 188 N.E.2d at 144-45,
237 N.Y.S.2d at 717-19.
In reaching its decision in Schwartz, the court of appeals relied on an earlier New
York case, Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co. See 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E.
824 (1936). In Schmidt, the New York Court of Appeals held that "the injury to the
plaintiff was complete when the alleged negligence of the defendant [plaintiff's em-
ployer] caused the plaintiff to inhale the deleterious dust" which resulted in the
plaintiff's developing pneumoconiosis some three years later. Id. at 301, 200 N.E. at
827. The Schmidt court thus held that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued at the
1218 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
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the statute of limitations, a plaintiff who was exposed to asbestos from
1945 to 1955 would find that his action is time-barred. However, the
court may also rule that the statute of limitations began to run on the
date when the plaintiff first discovered that he had an asbestos-related
condition and that his asbestos-related condition was caused by his
exposure to asbestos. This latter formula for applying a statute of
limitations has become known as the "discovery rule;" in one form or
another, it is the law of most progressive jurisdictions, including
Pennsylvania. 24
In Pennsylvania, the discovery rule was first promulgated in the
1959 medical malpractice case, Ayers v. Morgan .25 In Ayers, the court
ruled that the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's negligence claim
did not begin to run until the plaintiff discovered that a sponge left
inside his body by the defendant physician during a surgical proce-
dure was the cause of his continuing difficulties. 26 The court rea-
soned that the legislative intent of the statute of limitations could not
moment of his first exposure, even though the resulting disease did not develop until
later. The court noted that the plaintiff could have brought a successful cause of
action at the time of his first exposure and recovered damages "which he could show
had resulted or would result" from his exposure. Id.
Generally, a long latency period is characteristic of asbestos-related and other
toxic-tort diseases. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text infra. In most jurisdic-
tions, a plaintiff is not legally injured, and thus has no cause of action, until he
manifests some physically objective and demonstrable injury. See, e.g., Amader v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (refusing to allow recovery
for increased risk of cancer and accompanying emotional distress brought on by ex-
posure to asbestos); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Il1. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d 1369
(1979) (refusing to allow recovery for the increased possibility of developing cancer
due to ih utero exposure to DES). Thus, if a plaintiff were to bring an action immedi-
ately following his exposure to a toxic substance, but before that toxic substance had
worked any demonstrable harm, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to
allege a sufficient present injury to sustain a cause of action. Yet, if he waits, his
action may be barred by the statute of limitations because the statutory period fre-
quently will be less than the latency period of the disease.
24. See Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959). For a brief state-by-
state review of the status of the discovery rule in various jurisdictions, see McGovern,
supra note 19, at 438-40. See generally, Schwartz & Krantz, Statute of Lbmitations bn Cases
ofInsidious Diseases, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 225 (1963); Comment, Asbestos Litigation:
The Dust has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55 (1978); Comment, Statutes of Limi-
tations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. PTT.
L. REV. 501 (1982).
25. 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959) (the statute of limitations in a medical
malpractice claim began to run at the time the plaintiff discovered the presence of
the foreign substance in his body and its resulting harm, not the time the substance
was left there by the defendant physician).
26. Id. at 285-90, 154 A.2d at 789-92. The plaintiff in Ayers for nine years had
experienced undiagnosed problems in the area of the previous surgery before the
sponge was determined to be the cause. Id. at 283, 154 A.2d at 788-89. The plaintiff
brought his action for professional negligence within the statutory period following
his discovery of the cause of his discomfort. Id.
1982-19831 1219
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be construed so as to require a plaintiff to bring a cause of action
before he became aware that he had been injured. 27
In the 1981 case of Anthony v. Koppers Co., 28 the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court ruled that the "discovery rule" was applicable in "creep-
ing disease" cases-those cases in which a plaintiff had contracted his
disease from continuous exposure to a hazardous substance, and in
which the injury and its cause may have been difficult to discover.29
27. Id. at 284-85, 154 A.2d at 789-90. To allow a construction of the statute
which would require the plaintiff to bring a cause of action before he was aware that
he had one, or before he could successfully maintain one, would, according to the
court, violate a principle of statutory construction that raises a presumption that
" '[t]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or
unreasonable.' " Id. at 284-85, 154 A.2d at 789 (quoting The Statutory Construction
Act of May 28, 1937, Pa. Laws 1019, Art. IV, § 52, 45 P.S. § 552). The court also
noted that the plaintiff could not have brought his cause of action immediately fol-
lowing the surgery because the harm the sponge caused, the breakdown of healthy
tissue, had not yet occurred. Id. at 287, 154 A.2d at 790. The court concluded that
the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff's cause of action
accrued, and that the cause of action did not accrue until the plaintiff became aware
of his condition and its cause. Id. at 290, 154 A.2d at 792.
28. 284 Pa. Super. 81, 425 A.2d 428 (1980).
29. Id. at 93, 425 A.2d at 434-35. In the Anthony case, the administratrices of
employees' estates filed suit against the decedents' employer and the manufacturers
of coke ovens, claiming that prolonged continuous exposure to emissions from the
ovens caused the lung cancer that resulted in the decedents' deaths. Id. at 85, 425
A.2d at 430. The defendants raised the statute of limitations defense, arguing that
the last possible date from which the statute could have started to run was the day of
the decedents' deaths. Id. at 86, 425 A.2d at 431. The court rejected the defendants'
argument, and held instead that the statute began to run on the date on which the
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the causal connection between the
defendants' conduct and the alleged injury. Id. at 100, 425 A.2d at 438.
The court identified "creeping diseases" as those diseases for which "it is difficult
to determine at what point the exposure caused the disease, and after the disease has
been contracted, to discover its cause." Id. at 93, 425 A.2d at 434. In reaching its
decision to apply the discovery rule to creeping disease cases, the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court in Anthony relied upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's earlier decision
to apply this rule to a silicosis case. Id. at 94, 425 A.2d at 435 (citing Ciabattoni v.
Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 386 Pa. 179, 125 A.2d 365 (1956)). The court
also noted that a majority of courts which had addressed the question, including the
Supreme Court of the United States, now apply the discovery rule to "creeping dis-
ease" cases. Id.
For cases in which the discovery rule was applied to creeping disease cases, see
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (silicosis); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestosis); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestosis and mesothelioma); R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963) (cancer of the larynx); Brush
Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960) (berylliosis); Ricciuti v.
Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960) (berylliosis); Strickland v. Johns-
Manville Int'l Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Texas 1978) (asbestosis); Velasquez v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1979) (as-
bestosis); Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos and Magnesium, 74 Il1. App. 3d 778, 392
N.E.2d 1352 (1979) (asbestosis); Miller v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 204 Kan. 184, 460
P.2d 535 (1969) (pulmonary fibrosis and emphysema); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979) (mesothelioma); Harig v. Johns-
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Toxic tort injuries are, by nature, frequently "creeping diseases;" the
alleged injury may not manifest itself until years, 30 or even genera-
tions,3 1 after a person's exposure to the toxic substance. Therefore
toxic tort injuries generally will be governed by the discovery rule.
Under the discovery rule in Pennsylvania, the statute of limita-
tions will begin to run when a plaintiff knows, or has reason to know
the following: 1) the existence of his injury; 2) the cause of his injury;
and 3) the causal connection between the injury and the operative
conduct. 32 In the Pennsylvania asbestos cases, this rule has been in-
terpreted to mean that in order for the statute of limitations to run,
Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (mesothelioma); Schiele v.
Hobart Corp., 284 Or. 483, 587 P.2d 1010 (1978) (pulmonary pneumonia).
30. The various asbestos-related diseases may manifest themselves between six
months and 50 years from the time of exposure. See Insurance Co. of North America
v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1236-37 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
There are three main asbestos-related diseases: asbestosis, mesothelioma (cancer of
the chest wall lining) and bronchogenic carcinoma (lung cancer). Id. at 1236. Asbes-
tosis results from the formation of scar tissue in the lung in response to the introduc-
tion of minute asbestos fibers. Id. This process of scar tissue formation takes about
six months from the time the individual fiber enters the lung and is irreversible. Id.
However, it may be many years before the presence of scar tissue can be detected,
and still longer before the scar tissues reaches such a level as to impair or incapacitate
the lung. Id. at 1236-37. The average latency period is 20 years from the initial
exposure, but it may be as long as 50 years. Id. at 1237.
Mesothelioma, cancer of the lining of the chest wall, results in a tumor, which
generally starts to grow after "a latent period of over 20 years during which there
need not be any additional exposure." Id. Once the tumor has begun to grow, diag-
nosis is relatively easy and death follows within two years. Id.
Bronchogenic carcinoma or lung cancer has an average latent period of 15-20
years. Id. Lung cancer progresses slowly and can be diagnosed "within a few years of
its initial appearance." Id.
For further discussion of the latency periods associated with asbestos and other
"creeping diseases," see Selikoff & Lee, Asbestos and Disease (1978), see also Mehaffy,
Asbestos-Related Lung Dzease, 16 FORUM 341 (1980); Selikoff, Bader, Bader, Churg &
Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplasis, 42 AM. J. MED. 487 (1967).
31. In the case of in utero exposure to DES, the toxic effects of exposure do not
manifest themselves in the women who took the drug, but rather in their daughters, a
generation later. See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liabiity, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 965-66 (1978). DES has been linked causally to adenocarcinoma
in daughters who were exposed in utero. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 594-95, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133 (1980). Adenocarcinoma, a
cancer affecting the vaginal and cervical areas, has a minimum latency period of 10-
12 years. Id. Once it manifests itself, it is fast-spreading and potentially fatal. Id.
The average latency period for DES-related disease is 19 years. Comment, Coping
with the Particularized Problems of Toxic Tort Litigation, 28 ViIi.. L. REV. 1298, 1300 n. 16
(1983).
32. See Volpe v. Johns-Manville Corp., 4 Phila. 290, 295 (1980) (the plaintiff's
claim was barred by the statute of limitations where plaintiff knew, or had reason to
know, of his injury, its cause, and its causal relationship with defendant's conduct
and had not filed his claim within the statutory period following his discovery). In
Volpe, Judge Takiff interpreted the Pennsylvania discovery rule to require that "three
independent phases of knowledge must be known or knowable to plaintiff before the
limitations period commences: (1) knowledge of the injury; (2) knowledge of the opera-
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the plaintiff had to know 1) that he had an asbestos-related disease,
2) that it was caused by exposure to asbestos, and 3) that this asbestos
exposure occurred at his place of employment. 33 In toxic tort cases
involving work-related exposures to a toxic substance, the third ele-
ment of the discovery rule is not difficult to ascertain. In cases of non-
occupational exposure, however, it may be more difficult for the
plaintiff to determine the source of his exposure. However, in either
context, not until the plaintiff has discovered the causal connection
between the source of his exposure to a toxic substance and his injury,
does the statute of limitations begin to run.34
Traditionally, the statute of limitations defense operated in an
objective fashion. It would cut off a person's right to bring a legal
action on a certain date following the commission of a tort.3 5 To pre-
vail under this defense, a defendant had to prove only that the date of
the alleged tort fell outside the statutory period. In a toxic tort case,
that date was generally the date of the injured party's first or last
exposure to the toxic substance.36 In contrast, under the discovery
rule, the essential date the defendant must establish is the date on
live cause of the injury; and (3) knowledge of the causative relationship between the
injury and the operative conduct." Id. (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at 305. The court in Volpe stated as follows:
Applying the foregoing governing legal principles to the uncontroverted
facts, we find that by December 1973, husband-plaintiff knew of his injury
(asbestosis and related pulmonary conditions), the operative cause of his
injury (inhalation of asbestos dust and asbestos fibers) and the causal con-
nection between his injury and the asbestos to which he was exposed in his
work environment.
Id. The court held that the statute of limitations commenced to run in December of
1973 and thus the plaintiff's action was time-barred. Id. at 305-06.
34. See Daniels v. Beryllium Corp., 227 F. Supp. 591, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1964). The
Daniels case involved a claim that the plaintiff's "beryllium poisoning was caused by
the contamination of the atmosphere by defendant's operation of its manufacturing
plant." Id. at 592. The plaintiff first became ill in 1949; her illness was diagnosed as
beryllium poisoning in 1953. She did not file suit though, until 1958. Id. The plain-
tiff claimed in her affidavits that she was unaware that her beryllium poisoning was
caused by the defendant's operations "until the time of filing suit." Id. at 593. The
court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that "the stat-
ute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiffs, by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have discovered that the wife's condition was caused by defendant's
operations." Id. at 595. The court preserved the "factual question of when plaintiffs
knew or should have known that the illness was attributable to defendant's activity"
for the jury's consideration. Id.
35. See Anthony, 284 Pa. Super. at 97, 425 A.2d at 437. See also Mitchell v.
United Elevator Co., 290 Pa. Super. 476, 434 A.2d 1243, 1248-49 (1981) (distincting
between statutes of limitation-which bar a plaintiff's right to a remedy after a pe-
riod of time and must be pleaded as an affirmative defense-and statutes of repose-
which abolish a plaintiff's cause of action after a period of time and may be raised in
a motion for nonsuit, directed verdict or judgment n.o.v.); See McGovern, supra note
19; Comment, supra note 31 at 1313 n.83.
36. See notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text supra.
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which the plaintiff possessed the subjective knowledge of the causal
connection between his injury and the source of his exposure. The
person best able to demonstrate when the plaintiff knew that he was
injured by a toxic substance is the plaintiff himself. Only an ill-pre-
pared or benevolent plaintiff would consciously bar his own cause of
action by readily admitting that he knew that he had been injured by
a toxic substance at some time prior to the applicable limitations pe-
riod. Consequently, a defendant's ability to utilize the statute of limi-
tations to bar stale claims is limited under the discovery rule.
In asbestos litigation, defendants have been successful in utilizing
medical records and disability claims to establish that a plaintiff knew
that he had an asbestos-related disease as a result of exposure to as-
bestos at his employer's workplace. However, the availability of those
documents to facilitate the use of the statute of limitations may be
peculiar to asbestos litigation, since many asbestos workers had their
only exposures to asbestos at government shipyards. Nevertheless,
medical and employment records are often a fruitful area of inquiry
in any toxic tort case, especially if a plaintiff alleges exposure to a
toxic substance during the course of his employment. Deposing a
plaintiff's family physician or treating physician may be another use-
ful device for gathering evidence to show that the plaintiffs claim is
time-barred under the discovery rule.
Plaintiffs whose claims have been barred-even by the relatively
liberal standards of the discovery rule-have consistently sought ways
to keep alive their time-barred causes of action. Some plaintiffs have
argued that the statute of limitations should not be activated until a
plaintiff knows the specific identity of the manufacturer to whose
products he has been exposed. 37 Other plaintiffs have argued that
they have been continually wronged until a time within the statutory
period.38 Finally, some plaintiffs have argued that the defendant
37. See, e.g., Staiano v. Johns-Manville Corp., 304 Pa. Super. 280, 450 A.2d 681
(1982) (the statute of limitations in any products liability claim in which the discov-
ery rule is applicable, begins to run at the time the plaintiff became aware of the
nature and cause of his injuries and of a causal connection to some operative con-
duct). In the Staiano case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that plaintiffs claims
in strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and fraud and conspiracy accrued,
and the statute of limitations commenced to run, once the plaintiff became aware of
"the salient facts concerning the occurrence of his injury and who or what caused it."
Id. at 288, 450 A.2d at 685. Although the plaintiff must have sufficient information
as to the possible source of his exposure to enable him to investigate further, he need
not necessarily know that he has a cause of action, that someone is legally culpable,
or that a particular defendant is responsible. Id. at 287, 450 A.2d at 684.
38. See, e.g., Daniels v. Beryllium Corp., 211 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (the
statute of limitations began to run on plaintiff's negligence claim at the time she
became aware of the nature and cause of her injury and its relation to defendant's
conduct and the statute was not tolled by defendant's continuing wrong). The plain-
1982-19831 1223
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wrongfully withheld knowledge from the public about the adverse
health effects of their products, and therefore should be precluded
from utilizing the statute of limitations since it was the defendant's
conduct that caused the plaintiff to rest on his rights.39 These argu-
ments have generally been unsuccessful. 40
Additional statute of limitations issues are caused by the peculiar
nature of toxic torts. Toxic substances may give rise to a variety of
injuries. For example, exposure to asbestos may cause asbestosis, lung
cancer, or mesothelioma. Courts have generally held that a plaintiffs
injuries are not divisible and that a party must bring all his claims for
injuries in one lawsuit. A plaintiff who was exposed to asbestos and
suffers from asbestosis might not, however, contract lung cancer until
after his asbestosis claim is time-barred.4 1 Consequently, plaintiffs
tiff in the Darnils case was diagnosed as suffering from beryllium poisoning in 1953,
but waited until 1958 to file suit against the beryllium manufacturer who was pollut-
ing the air near her residence with beryllium particles. Id. at 453. During the inter-
vening years between plaintiff's diagnosis and her filing of the claim, she continued to
live at her residence and breathe air polluted by defendant's plant. Id. The court
rejected her argument that the statute of limitations had not yet begun to run be-
cause the defendant's conduct constituted one ongoing, uninterrupted wrong. Id. at
455-56. The court held that, "[t]he subsequent continuance of the wrong cannot
serve to toll the running of the statute of limitations on the earlier injury of which the
plaintiff had knowledge." Id. at 456.
39. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., 416 Pa. 89, 204 A.2d 473 (1964). In
Nesbil, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that if defendant's insurance com-
pany's misleading or fraudulent statements to the plaintiff about the status of her
claim and its intention to settle with her caused the plaintiff to unduly relax her
vigilance and delay institution of a suit against the defendant, then the defendant
was estopped to raise the defense of the statute of limitations. However, "mere mis-
take, misunderstanding or lack of knowledge" does not toll the statute; there must be
"fraud or concealment" and it must induce the plaintiff to delay. Volpe v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 4 Phila. 290, 304 (1980). See also Schaffer v. Larzelere, 410 Pa. 402,
189 A.2d 267 (1963) (fraud or concealment on the part of a defendant concerning the
circumstances surrounding the release of plaintiff's decedent from the hospital, which
caused plaintiff to delay in filing a claim of negligence against the defendant physi-
cian for releasing the decedent prematurely, would toll the statute of limitations);
Courts v. Campbell, 245 Pa. Super. 326, 369 A.2d 425 (1976) (plaintiffs' misunder-
standing or mistaken belief that defendant's insurance company would pay them
more than their medical expenses incurred from injuries sustained in an automobile
accident did not toll the statute of limitations on their claim because it did not consti-
tute fraud or concealment on defendant's part).
40. See notes 37-39 supra.
41. See, e.g., Slaiano v. Johns-Manv//e Corp., 304 Pa. Super. at 296, 450 A.2d at
688. In Slazano, the court stated that "a new limitation period does not start each
time a new disease develops from the same tortious conduct of the defendant." Id.
Because the plaintiff knew or should have known of his asbestosis five years before he
filed suit, he was denied recovery even though it was not until later that he learned of
his "pleural thickening" as a result of asbestos exposure. Id. at 296, 450 A.2d at 689.
In making its decision in Slaiano, the superior court relied upon Shadle v. Pearce, where
it had held that the plaintiffs claim for professional negligence was barred by the
statute of limitations. Id. (citing Shadle v. Pearce, 287 Pa. Super. 436, 430 A.2d 683
(1981)). The plaintiffs cause of action was barred in Shadle because he had delayed
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with mild cases of asbestosis sometimes seek additional damages on
the theory that they have an increased risk of developing lung cancer
and mesothelioma.42 Whether plaintiffs have actually recovered for
this increased risk is uncertain. In a number of cases where such an
filing for more than two years after becoming aware of defendant's negligence and
could not claim complications, arising from the injury as a new injury for purposes of
the running of the statute of limitations. Shadle v. Pearce, 287 Pa. Super. 436, 430
A.2d 683 (1981). See also Carbonaro v. Johns-Manville Corp., 526 F. Supp. 260 (E.D.
Pa. 1981),af dmem., 688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1982). In Carbonaro, the plaintiff had filed
a claim in state court which was barred by the statute of limitations. Almost immedi-
ately thereafter, he filed a federal court claim which was nearly identical to his state
claim, except that in the latter action he sought recovery for cancer, as well as asbes-
tosis. Id. at 261. In invoking the doctrine of res judicata, the court necessarily im-
plied that the plaintiff's federal court action did not state a new claim, even though it
included an additional allegation of a different sort of injury. The Carbonaro court
decided that the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate the same claim because the
subject-matter and injuries alleged in the second complaint arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the subject-matter of the first litigation. Id. at 262.
But see Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In
Wilson, the court held that the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's decedent's
claim for mesothelioma began to run in 1978, when he was diagnosed as having that
disease, and not in 1973, when he was diagnosed as having mild asbestosis. Id. at
120-21. The court reasoned that mesothelioma was a separate, distinct disease, and
that the discovery of mild asbestosis did not give the decedent notice that the conse-
quence of mesothelioma was reasonably certain to follow since only 12-15% of asbes-
tos victims eventually develop mesothelioma. Id. at 119-20. Thus, the Wilson court
concluded that the decedent could not have recovered anticipated future damages
for mesothelioma at the time his asbestosis was diagnosed because it was too specula-
tive a result. Id. Rather than deny recovery for the subsequent injury and thereby
encourage litigation of all "mild asbestosis" claims, the court held that the injuries
were sufficiently divisible to allow for separate claims, each accruing at the discovery
of the disease in question. Id. at 120-21. See also Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 525 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding that the statute of limitations on
plaintiff's decedent's claim for bronchogenic carcinoma as a result of asbestos expo-
sure commenced to run upon his discovery of the bronchogenic carcinoma, not at his
earlier diagnosis of asbestosis; if the injuries were considered indivisible, plaintiffs
would have to file suit at the slightest sign of trouble and seek speculative damages).
42. See, e.g., Amader v. Johns-Manville, 514 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The
district court in Amader held that the plaintiff husband's increased risk of developing
cancer was not a sufficient injury to sustain the plaintiff wife's claims for the resulting
emotional distress. Id. at 1033. The court distinguished the injury of increased risk of
cancer from other types of physical injuries to the husband for which the plaintiff
wife could recover. Specifically, the court held that the injury giving rise to an emo-
tional distress claim by a third party must be "sudden and violent," and have a
"direct emotional impact on the plaintiff." d. at 1032-33 (citing Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 170-73, 404 A.2d 672, 685-86 (1979)). See also Wilson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
In one case, the issue of whether the plaintiff had contracted an asbestos-related
disease was severed and tried first. See Dorfman v. Johns-Manville Corp., C.P. Phila.
Cty., Sept. Term, 1978, No. 88 (123), Case 19. The jury answered special interroga-
tories and determined that the plaintiff was not suffering from an asbestos-related
disease. Id. Following the jury verdict, plaintiffs counsel advised defense counsel
that the plaintiff would not appeal the jury's decision, but reserved the right to bring
another action if the plaintiff later developed an asbestos-related disease.
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argument was put forth, the juries did make substantial awards;43 in
other cases employing the same argument, the juries gave very small
awards, thus seeming to reject such claims.4 4
A related issue is whether an injured party whose initial toxic
tort claim is time-barred can maintain successfully a subsequent ac-
tion when he develops a second asbestos-related disease which
stemmed from the same exposure to asbestos. This issue has not yet
been resolved conclusively. 45
Under the discovery rule, cases brought on behalf of a decedent
must be commenced within two years of the decedent's death, assum-
ing the decedent lacked the requisite awareness to trigger the statute
during his lifetime.46 In other words, when an injured party has died,
the statute of limitations is triggered by the objective event of death.
If the decedent, prior to death, possessed the requisite awareness of his
injury and its cause, then the statute would have begun to run at the
time he discovered his injury and its cause. 47
B. Medical Causation
In order for a plaintiff to recover damages in a toxic tort case, he
must prove that he has been injured and that the defendant's toxic
substance caused his injury. 48 Although there have been attempts to
argue that exposure to an injurious agent constituted an "injury," as
a general matter, mere exposure to a toxic substance is not regarded
as an "injury. '49 The plaintiff must demonstrate some physical dam-
43. See, e.g., McDonald v. Johns-Manville Corp., C.P. Phila. Cty., Sept. Term,
1978, No. 88 (123), Case 45 (jury award in excess of $1,000,000 in an asbestos-related
injury case in which the plaintiff suffered from a minor case of pleural thickening and
admitted that he was not disabled).
44. See, e.g., Hughes v. Johns-Manville Corp., C.P. Phila. Cty., Sept. Term,
1978, No. 88 (123), Case 33 (small jury award in an asbestos-related injury case in
which the plaintiff suffered from a mild case of pleural thickening and was not
disabled).
45. See note 41 supra.
46. Anthony, 284 Pa. at 101-09, 425 A.2d at 437-42.
47. Id.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 431 (1979). For the text of§ 431 of
the Second Restatement, see note 52 tnfra.
49. See, e.g., Amader v. Johns-Manville, 514 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (fear
of increased risk of cancer held insufficient injury to sustain a claim for emotional
distress); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 11. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d 1369 (1979) (the
nexus between exposure to DES in utero and the possibility of developing cancer in
the future was not a sufficient basis upon which to recognize a present injury in a
negligence or strict liability claim against DES manufacturers). But see Plummer v.
United.States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978) (plaintiffs' exposure to, and infection from,
active tubercle bacilli while imprisoned in a federal penitentiary was a sufficient in-
jury to sustain their negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, regardless
of whether the plaintiffs actually developed the disease of tuberculosis).
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age that is ascertainable through medical examination. This require-
ment is especially important in the toxic tort context because a
plaintiff may not manifest an objective, physically ascertainable in-
jury until years after his exposure to the toxic substance has ceased. 50
A further complication in a toxic tort case is that the alleged
injury often can be attributed to factors other than the plaintiff's ex-
posure to a toxic substance. Respiratory ailments, various forms of
cancer, heart problems, and blood diseases are all conditions that
have been linked to exposure to a toxic substance. 5' Since these
health problems can also be attributed to other etiological causes, one
wonders how close the causal nexus must be between exposure to a
toxic substance and the subsequent development of a causally-related
physical ailment. Moreover, the type of injury caused by exposure to
a toxic substance generally cannot be attributed to a specific exposure
or to exposure during a specific period of time. Depending upon the
law of the jurisdiction as to burden of proof, these complications in
toxic tort injuries can give rise to significant problems of proof for
either the plaintiff or the defendant.
In Pennsylvania, plaintiffs burden of proof as to the causal
nexus between both his exposure to a toxic substance and his subse-
quent development of disease has been simplified. Pennsylvania law
provides that in order to.recover in a negligence action, an injured
party need only prove that the defendant's conduct was a "substan-
tial factor" in bringing about his injury. 52 This rule of negligence can
50. For a discussion of the latency periods of some representative toxic sub-
stances, see notes 30 & 31 supra.
51. See, e.g., Borel & Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-85
(5th Cir. 1973) (discussion of various diseases associated with exposure to asbestos,
including asbestosis, and some forms of cancer), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(summary of claims asserted included personal injury claims of Vietnam veterans
who were themselves exposed to the herbicide Agent Orange while in military serv-
ice; claims of wives of Vietnam veterans whose miscarriages were allegedly caused by
their husbands' exposure to Agent Orange; and claims of children of Vietnam veter-
ans whose genetic injuries and birth defects were allegedly caused by their parents'
exposure to Agent Orange). See generally I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, ASBESTOS AND Dis-
EASE (1978).
52. Whitner. v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448, 457-58, 263 A.2d 889, 894 (1970) (adopting
the language of § 431 of the Second Restatement of Torts and holding that an actor's
negligent conduct is the legal cause of a plaintiff's harm if it is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm resulting from an automobile accident).
Section 431 of the Second Restatement reads as follows:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,
and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of
the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
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be applicable in toxic tort cases. 53 The law in Pennsylvania also rec-
ognizes that there may be more than one cause for a plaintiff's condi-
tion; the plaintiff need prove only that defendant's conduct was a
substantial contributing factor, not that it was the sole cause of his
injury.54 Thus, in a case where a defendant asserts that the plaintiff's
lung cancer was primarily caused by a lifelong smoking habit, the
plaintiff may counter successfully by contending that his exposure to
defendant's toxic substance was a substantial contributing factor to
his disease.
The defendant's position is particularly precarious under Penn-
sylvania law because once the plaintiff has established that the de-
fendant's conduct is a contributing factor to his injury, the defendant
will become liable for all harm which foreseeably flows from the
plaintiff's condition. 55 Thus, if the jury determines that the defend-
ant's contribution was substantial, the defendant will be liable for all
the damage unless he can show that the damage would have resulted
notwithstanding his contribution. 56 Under Pennsylvania law, the
53. Although there is no specific toxic tort case approving of the use of the negli-
gence "substantial factor" test, a practitioner can safely argue the applicability of this
standard to toxic torts since it is the one commonly used in other non-toxic products
liability cases brought in negligence. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 265
F.2d 482, 486 (3rd Cir. 1959) (plaintiffs have burden of proving that the manufac-
turer's conduct in constructing an airplane was a substantial factor in causing the
deaths of passengers killed in an airplane crash).
54. See PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 3.27 (1981).
One set of standard jury instructions in Pennsylvania allows the jury to be instructed
that "[w]here the negligent conduct of a defendant combines with other circum-
stances and other forces to cause the harm suffered by the plaintiff, the defendant is
responsible for the harm if his negligent conduct was a substantial contributive factor
in bringing about the harm, even if the harm would have occurred without it." Id.
For examples of how the courts have dealt with the concept of "substantial contribu-
tive factors," see Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978) (reversible
error to instruct the jury as in a medical malpractice case that the defendant's con-
duct could only be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury if it were the sole
cause); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977) (question for the jury to
decide whether defendant's negligence in maintaining his property was a substantial
contributing factor to a fire on the property and thus the proximate cause of damages
to the plaintiffs adjoining property).
55. The Second Restatement of Torts addresses this issue:
The negligent actor is subject to liability for harm to another although a
physical condition of the other which is neither known nor should be known
to the actor makes the injury greater than that which the actor as a reason-
able man should have foreseen as a probable result of his conduct.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1965).
56. See, e.g., Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 254, 205 A.2d 873 (1965) (where
a defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm,
concurring causes do not relieve the defendant of liability in negligence unless the
defendant shows that the concurring causes would have brought about the same
harm independent of his negligent conduct); DeMaine v. Brillhart, 224 Pa. Super.
241, 303 A.2d 506 (1973) (a foreseeable intervening cause did not relieve a defendant
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jury in a strict liability case is not permitted to reduce recovery by the
amount the plaintiff contributed to his own harm, nor is the jury per-
mitted to award damages only for the amount a particular defendant
contributed to the plaintiffs harm. 57 Neither the plaintiffs exposure
to toxic substances other than those of the defendant nor the plain-
tiffs lifestyle are taken into account. This facet of the law is particu-
larly threatening to toxic tort defendants since the types of injuries
frequently alleged in toxic tort cases are often fairly common ailments
in older Americans, ailments which may be the products of lifestyle
and age, as well as toxic substances. 58
In one asbestos case, plaintiffs decedent, who had been a ciga-
rette smoker, suffered from a serious emphysema condition which was
undisputedly cigarette related. Plaintiff contended that his decedent
also suffered from asbestosis.59 Defendants denied that plaintiff suf-
fered from asbestosis. At trial, plaintiff contended that even a minor
amount of asbestosis should make the defendants liable for his dece-
dent's pulmonary condition since that minor amount of asbestosis
when combined with decedent's underlying emphysema would be a
"substantial factor" in decedent's disability and death. The jury re-
jected this contention, implicitly stating that it would be unfair to
make the defendants responsible for decedent's pulmonary condition
which was undeniably in large part self-inflicted. 60
In order to establish his case on the issue of medical causation,
the plaintiff needs only an expert witness, usually a physician, to as-
sert with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the plaintiffs
exposure to the defendant's toxic substance was a substantial contrib-
uting factor in bringing about the plaintiffs condition. 61 The defend-
of liability in negligence where his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in
bringing about plaintiffs injury in an automobile accident).
57. See Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 254, 205 A.2d 873 (1965); DeMaine
v. Brillhart, 224 Pa. Super. 241, 303 A.2d 506 (1973). See also PA. SUGGESTED STAN-
DARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 3.27 (1981). For text of these jury instructions,
see note 54supra. In negligence actions, the jury may be permitted to reduce a plain-
tiff's recovery by the percentage amount that the plaintiff contributed to his own
injuries. See Berry v. Friday, No. slip op. at 834 (Pa. Super. Jan. 13, 1984).
58. For example, in addition to lung cancer, asbestos has been linked causally to
higher rates of other types of cancer which are not uncommon in the general popula-
tion; these include cancer of the esophagus, stomach, colon-rectum, larynx, pharynx,
and kidney. See Selikoff, Asbestos-Associated Disease, in ASBESTOS LITIGATION 21 (W.
Alcorn ed. 1982). See also I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 52.
59. Moore v. Johns-Manville Corp., C.P. Phila. Cty., February Term, 1977, No.
942.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981). In
Migues, the plaintiffs expert medical witness testified that the plaintiffs husband had
died of mesothelioma, that the only known cause of mesothelioma is inhalation of
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ant will counter plaintiffs contentions by presenting his expert
witness who will testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
that plaintiff either does not suffer from the condition that he alleges
or that defendant's toxic substance was not a substantial contributing
factor to plaintiffs condition.62 However, since all that plaintiff must
asbestos fibres, and that even a very limited exposure can produce this fatal lung
disease. Id. at 1185. Since the defendant offered no evidence to contradict the testi-
mony of the plaintiff's expert, the court affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff:
In sum, plaintiff introduced uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Migues died
of mesothelioma, that asbestos fibres were present in his lungs at the time of
death, that asbestos inhalation is the only known cause of mesothelioma,
that Nicolet [the defendant] produced insulation products containing asbes-
tos, and that Mr. Migues worked with Nicolet asbestos products during the
course of his employment as an insulator. We find that there was more
than sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury's conclusion that
Nicolet's products were a producing cause of Mr. Migues' death.
Id. at 1185 (citing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th
Cir. 1973)). See also Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969). In
Basko, the plaintiff suffered from a rare eye disease allegedly caused by the defendant
drug manufacturer's product. Id. at 419. Basko was brought under a strict liability
theory. Id. At the trial in the lower court the plaintiff presented expert medical
witnesses who testified that in their opinions, the plaintiff's condition was caused by
the defendant's drug. Id. One of the witnesses, a chief opthalmologist at a Connecti-
cut hospital, stated, " 'I can't think of any other disease or drug that could do it.' "
Id. When asked how certain he was he answered, " 'I'm about as certain as anyone
can be about any condition in medicine.' " Id.
See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir.
1973) (plaintiff presented expert testimony to establish that his exposure to asbestos
constituted probable cause in fact of his condition, and that the defendant's failure to
warn was "a substantial factor in bringing it about"), cert. denkd, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
Noting that at trial the determination of causality is based on a preponderance
of evidence rather than on absolute proof, one forensic medical specialist has set forth
the following criteria to establish causation:
1. That a statistically significant association be established between expo-
sure to the agent and subsequent development of specific disease(s).
2. That correspondence be sought between the extent of exposure and the
appearance of essential elements of disease, i.e., that at least some de-
gree of dose-response relationship be demonstrated. This may not hold
for some asbestos-related cancers which may follow relatively little ex-
posure (enough to initiate neoplastic growth at one site). This is partic-
ularly true of mesotheliomas.
3. That the agent be demonstrated in tissue and that its concentration in
an exposed person is greater than in the nonexposed. This may not
hold for some instances of chrysotile exposure, since this mineral can go
into solution (slowly) in tissue fluids. (Many carcinogens, such as vinyl
chloride or radiation, are not stored in tissue and therefore cannot be
demonstrated to be present when malignant lesions occur.)
4. That the role of numerous attendant circumstances capable of influenc-
ing the appearance or manifestation of the disease initiated by the
agent can be evaluated.
Ehrenreich, Espinosa, Langer, Rohl & Daum, Asbestos-Related Diseases Algorithm for
Forenstc Pathological Diagnosis in Toxic TORTS ADVOCACY 131, 135-36 (1983).
62. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969). In Basko,
a strict products liability action, the plaintiff's expert witness contended that plain-
tiff's blindness was caused by the defendant's drug (chloroquine). Id. at 419. The
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prove in order to recover fully is that defendant's toxic substance was
one of several substantial contributing factors to his condition, the
plaintiff will normally prevail if the case becomes simply a battle of
the experts. 6
3
The trial of a toxic tort case, however, need not be merely a bat-
tle of the experts. Defense counsel may do a variety of things in order
to weaken the position taken by plaintiffs expert or to strengthen the
position of his own expert. First, defense counsel can contest the ex-
tent of plaintiffs exposure to the toxic substance.6 4 For example,
defendant countered with a number of expert witnesses who stated that the disease
originally suffered by the plaintiff-lupus erythematosus-for which she was admin-
istered the drug in question, was itself capable of producing blindness. Id. at 430
n. 17. On cross examination, one of the plaintiff's witnesses admitted that some stud-
ies had shown a significant incidence of the eye disease which had caused the plain-
tiff's blindness in patients suffering from lupus, regardless of chloroquine treatment.
Id.
The Second Circuit held that in light of this conflicting medical testimony, "the
jury should have been instructed on the 'substantial factor' test of multiple causa-
tion." Id. at 430. The Court then reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 431.
For further discussion of Basko, see supra and notes 63 & 91 infra.
63. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1969) (in a
strict liability action where the plaintiff's injury could have been caused by either or
both products manufactured by different defendant drug suppliers, the plaintiff need
only prove that each of the drugs was a "substantial factor in producing her injury");
Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (since
"[a] defendant's conduct is a proximate cause of any injury whenever it is a substan-
tial factor in bringing about the harm," an asbestos supplier's failure to warn was a
proximate cause despite intervening acts by others). But see Reyes v. Wyeth Labora-
tories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1288-89 (5th Cir. 1974) (when there is a battle of the experts
over the question of causation, the final determination is "within the jury's preroga-
tive; expert witnesses appear to assist in the court's decision-making process, not to
control it").
With regard to the "substantial factor" doctrine in negligence actions, section
432(2) of the Second Restatement states as follows:
If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence,
the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is
sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be
found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965).
64. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The Borel court, in discussing the latency
periods of asbestos diseases, noted that the length of the periods appears to be af-
fected by the intensity, as well as the duration, of exposure to asbestos. Id. at 1083.
See also Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1981). In an action
brought by a deceased insulator's spouse against manufacturers of insulation prod-
ucts, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had offered no substantial evidence of
decedent's exposure to the defendant's insulation products. Id. at 1184. The Migues
court disagreed, however, noting that three of the decedent's former coworkers had
testified to his use of the defendant's product. Id. at 1185. The Migues court con-
cluded that since the defendant had introduced no evidence contradicting that testi-
mony, it was a proper question for the jury as to whether Mr. Migues was exposed to
asbestos products manufactured by the defendant. Id. For a further discussion of
Migues, see note 60 supra and notes 87 & 120 thfra.
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many of the litigants in the Philadelphia asbestos actions were em-
ployees of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. Some of these employees
were former pipe coverers, plumbers, or electricians who spent most
of their time working on board ships and whose exposure to asbestos
was not seriously in dispute. A significantly large number of shipyard
employees, however, did not work aboard ships, and thus were not
subjected to daily asbestos exposure. Consequently, the extent of
these employees' exposure to asbestos is a matter of legitimate dis-
pute. These workers may have spent most of their time working in
locations where asbestos was generally not used, or they may not have
started to work at the shipyard until after asbestos use was severely
curtailed. Assuming that the plaintiffs medical expert has relied
upon a less than complete and accurate work history, the defense
counsel may be able to show that the work history relied upon by
plaintiff's expert differs from the plaintiffs actual work history. In
this manner, the credibility of the plaintiffs expert can be weakened.
Where possible, defense counsel should also try to demonstrate
that the plaintiff has had a number of other significant exposures to
toxic substances. 65 Many of the asbestos-related disease plaintiffs
were lifelong smokers. In a lung cancer case involving a smoker, it is
especially helpful to produce evidence concerning the extent of a
plaintiff's smoking history. A plaintiff who smokes two packs of ciga-
rettes a day for forty years will have smoked 584,000 cigarettes by the
time he takes the witness stand. In a lung cancer case where a plain-
tiff who smokes alleges that his lung cancer was caused by exposure to
a toxic substance, this statistic alone should give the jury some cause
for hesitation. Nearly all jurors are well aware that smoking is a seri-
ous health hazard, and a plaintiffs expert who attempts to disregard
or underplay the importance of plaintiffs smoking history will only
weaken his own credibility in the eyes of the jury.
Similarly, many asbestos plaintiffs have worked in coal mines or
other dust-related industries prior to their asbestos-related employ-
ment. If such a plaintiff claims his respiratory ailment was caused by
65. In cases of lung cancer and mesothelioma, pathologists today are unable to
determine whether cigarette smoking or asbestos dust is the cause of a particular
malignant tumor. See Comment, Issues in Asbestos Li'tgation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871,
875 (1983). Authorities have found, however, that cigarettes are co-carcinogens with
asbestos. Id. at 893. Researchers, therefore, suggest that smokers who are exposed to
asbestos are statistically more likely to contract lung cancer than non-smokers. Id. at
893 n.135. Some courts have allowed recovery for lung cancer and mesothelioma
under workmen's compensation programs, thereby implicitly accepting the causal
connection between asbestos and cancer. See Utter v. Asten-Hill Mfg. Co., 453 Pa.
401, 309 A.2d 583 (1973); Celotex Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 70 Pa.
Commw. 407, 453 A.2d 373 (1982); Powell v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 273
S.E.2d 932 (W. Va. 1980).
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asbestos exposure, defense counsel should demonstrate to the jurors
the degree to which coal dust alone can seriously impair the function
of one's lungs. If the jury is sufficiently alerted to the dangers of coal
dust and is made sufficiently aware that plaintiffs exposure to coal
dust is at least five times as great as plaintiffs exposure to asbestos,
the jury might be willing to find that plaintiffs condition was in large
measure caused by plaintiffs exposure to coal dust, and not by his
exposure to asbestos.
Finally, in some cases involving toxic substances, defense counsel
can demonstrate that the opinion of plaintiffs expert is based on in-
complete symptomatology. 66 For example, in many cases the plaintiff
will claim he suffers from a shortness of breath. Often the plaintiff
will claim that this shortness of breath indicates asbestosis. This
symptom, however, can be attributed to a variety of factors, including
obesity and smoking. In a case which involves an overweight plaintiff
with a long history of smoking who claims he experiences shortness of
breath, the defense counsel's expert should determine whether there
66. Asbestosis is a nonmalignant scarring of the lungs caused by the accumula-
tion and subsequent spreading of asbestos fibers in the lungs. See W. PARKS, OCCU-
PATIONAL LUNG DISORDERS 255-56 (2d ed. 1982). When asbestos fibers are inhaled,
an inflammation of the lungs occurs which results in functioning lung tissue being
replaced by scar tissue. As this process continues, the lungs are increasingly incapa-
ble of either diffusing oxygen to the blood or of releasing carbon dioxide. See Com-
ment, The Causation Problem in Asbestos Litigation: Is There an Alternative Theory of
Liability?, 15 IND. L. REV. 679, 679 n.5 (1982). Symptoms of asbestosis include the
following: shortness of breath; rales (lung noises); coughing; restricted pulmonary
lung function; clubbing or curvature of the fingers and toes; and deficient oxygena-
tion of the blood that causes a bluish coloration of the skin and mucous membrane.
Becklake, Asbestos-Related Diseases of the Lung and Other Organs.- Their Epidemiology and
Implications for Clinical Practice, 114 AM. REV. OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE 187, 208
(1976).
Mesothelioma is a malignant tumor usually occurring in the chest, but can also
arise in the stomach or heart. The cancer, once formed, spreads throughout the lin-
ing of the chest, abdomen, or heart. See Chahinian, Malignant Mesothelioma, in CAN-
CER MEDICINE 1744 (J. Holland & E. Frie eds. 1972). Symptoms of pleural (chest)
mesothelioma, the most common form of the disease, include the following: breath-
lessness; steadily increasing chest pain; and loss of appetite accompanied by loss of
weight. Symptoms of peritoneal (stomach) mesothelioma include the following: ab-
dominal discomfort; swelling; lethargy; and weakness. W, MORGAN & A. SEATON,
OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASES 363-64 (1974).
For a further discussion of the symptomatology of asbestosis and mesothelioma,
see Comment, Asbestos Litigation. The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55,
58 & n.21 (1978); Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 873-74
(1983).
Defense counsel, however, should be aware that in a recent case a federal district
court appeared unperturbed by the generality of the plaintiff's allegations of lung
damage. See Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn.
1982). The court merely observed in a footnote that "[i]t is unclear whether Bertrand
claims to have either asbestosis or mesothelioma." Id. at 540 n. 1.
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exists other evidence that could support a diagnosis of asbestosis. 67
Due to the unique way asbestos fibers interact with lung tissue, x-ray
evidence may reveal changes of the lungs which would support a di-
agnosis of asbestosis.68 Absent such corroborating evidence, the de-
fense may be able to demonstrate that the plaintiff's expert has based
his diagnosis on insufficient evidence.
The same pattern of proof can be used in lung cancer cases.
Lung cancer has many causes. In a case involving a worker who al-
leges his lung cancer resulted from his exposure to asbestos, the de-
fense's expert must determine whether the plaintiff evidences any
other physical symptoms which demonstrate that his cancer was
caused by exposure to asbestos. Again, an x-ray or pulmonary study
can help to demonstrate whether the cancer specifically arose from
exposure to asbestos. 69 Not all diseases caused by toxic substances,
however, have such corroborating evidence. Nevertheless, in in-
stances where such corroborating evidence should exist but is not
present, defense counsel should highlight this absence to undermine
the credibility of the plaintiff's expert.
In short, one of the best techniques that defense counsel can use
in a toxic substance case is to show that there exists a tenuous rela-
tionship between the plaintiffs alleged injury and the defendant's
product. The more successfully defense counsel demonstrates 1) that
plaintiff's exposure to a toxic substance was limited, 2) that plaintiff's
condition can be attributed to a variety of other causes, or 3) that
plaintiff lacks corroborating evidence of the condition which he
67. See, e.g., Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 525 F. Supp. 894, 902 (E.D. Va.
1979) (defendant sought to establish through cross examination of plaintiff's expert
medical witness, that plaintiff's respiratory problems could have resulted from obesity
rather than from asbestosis), af'd in part, vacated zn part, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981).
68. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. dented, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). In Borel, the plaintiff had been x-rayed in
1964 and the doctors found that his lungs were "cloudy." Id. In 1969, a lung biopsy
was performed on him and at this time his condition was positively diagnosed as
pulmonary asbestosis. Id. X-rays cannot detect asbestosis in its early stages, but as
the scar tissue accumulates, x-rays become relatively effective in detecting the disease.
Becklake, supra note 66, at 208. Three pioneers in asbestos disease research per-
formed an extensive study of x-ray changes in asbestos insulation workers. Selikoff,
Churg & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Industrial Insulalton Workers, 132
ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCi. 139 (1965). They found that x-rays of workers who had had
exposure to asbestos 10 to 19 years before examination were only minimally useful in
detecting asbestosis. Id. at 147. However, among those men x-rayed who had been
exposed 20 years or more prior to examination, the large majority had x-ray evidence
of pulmonary asbestosis. Id.
69. In asbestos-related lung cancer, the location of the cancer is in the lower
lobes of the lung and is therefore more difficult to detect than other forms of lung
cancer. 4A R. GRAY, ATTORNEY's TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 205c.71 (4th ed.
1981).
1234 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
27
Goggin and Brophy: Toxic Torts: Workable Defenses Available to the Corporate Defenda
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
Toxic TORTS
claims, the more likely it will be that a jury will discount the relation-
ship between plaintiffs condition and his exposure to defendant's
toxic substance. Although this evidence may not operate as a bar to
recovery in states such as Pennsylvania which allow a plaintiff to re-
cover if the defendant's product were a "substantial factor" in caus-
ing the plaintiff injury, it may serve to mitigate damages. A jury may
be reluctant to impose a full measure of damages-even when in-
structed to do so-on a defendant whose toxic substance was only
one factor contributing to the plaintiffs condition.
C. Product Identification
In any personal injury lawsuit, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant injured him. In a toxic tort lawsuit, the plaintiff must
prove that it was the defendant's toxic substance that injured him. 70
For a number of reasons, proving this will not always be an easy mat-
ter. First of all, the injuries associated with the toxic substances may
not occur until long after the plaintiff had been exposed to the toxic
substance and his memory may have faded. 71 Second, it is likely that
when the plaintiff was exposed to the toxic substance he was not
aware of the toxicity of the substance, and therefore did not take par-
ticular notice of the manufacturer or producer of the substance. 72
Moreover, the product may have been packaged and marketed in
70. Product identification is not the same issue as causation. See McElhaney v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D.S.D. 1983). "Causation [relates] to the
question of what instrumentality or mechanism caused the plaintiffs injury .... "
Id. (citations omitted). Product identification, however, involves identifying the
source of the instrumentality. Id. See also Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509
F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (a plaintiffs proof of mere exposure to asbestos
establishes causation, leaving him only with the burden of identifying the source of
the asbestos product), rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
71. For a discussion of the long latency periods that often characterize toxic tort
injuries, see notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
72. Plaintiffs in DES cases face almost insurmountable difficulties in identifying
the manufacturer or supplier of the pills which had been taken by their mothers as
many as 30 years ago. The facts recited by the court in McCreeoy v. Eli Lilly & Co. are
typical:
Discovery revealed that plaintiff did not know and could not ascertain
the specific pharmaceutical compound taken by her mother or the identity
of the manufacturer; that her mother was unable to remember the name,
color, dosage or dosage frequency of the medicine taken; . . . that her
mother's doctor could not recall the drug prescribed or whether he had
preferred one manufacturer's drug over that of another; that the pharmacy
that had filled the prescription had been sold upon the owner's retirement
and that the records pertaining to the prescription had been destroyed; and
that the only record relating to the prescription kept by the doctor. . . [did
not refer to a brand name].
87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 80, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 732 (1978). For a further discussion of the
McCreery decision, see note 75 infa.
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such a fashion that even if the plaintiff were aware of the toxicity of a
particular substance, he would have had no way to know that the
product he was using contained that toxic substance. Third, the toxic
substance to which the plaintiff was exposed may have been manu-
factured and sold by a number of different manufacturers and suppli-
ers. 73 Finally, the plaintiffs exposure to the toxic substance may have
occurred long after the product had been removed from its container,
and the container may have been the only means of identifying the
supplier/manufacturer of the product.74 Despite these difficulties,
most jurisdictions still require a toxic tort plaintiff to prove the iden-
tity of the manufacturer or supplier of the toxic substance that he
alleges caused his injury. 75
73. Toxic tort cases are often characterized by the presence of multiple defend-
ants. For example, asbestos-related disease litigation typically involves multiple de-
fendants. As one judge recently noted, of 27 asbestos-related lawsuits ready for trial
in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, every one had
more than 10 defendants. The number of defendants generally varies between 10-20.
In one action, the judge observed, there are 55 defendants. Surrick, Punitive Damages
and Asbestos Litigation in Pennsylvania: Punishment or Annihilation? 87 DICK. L. REV. 265,
283 n.101 (1983).
In DES cases the problems of identification are particularly complicated. Aside
from faded memories and lost records, DES had been manufactured or distributed as
a generic drug by over 100 different companies. Often not even the dispensing phar-
macists knew who manufactured the DES they sold, since the chain of distribution
went from manufacturer to wholesaler to pharmacy. See McElhaney v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 267-68 (D.S.D. 1983); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp.
1004, 1007 (D.S.C. 1981).
74. See, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975),
modifd and afd, 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978). In Drayton, a child had been burned
badly when a household solution used to unstop drains accidently spilled on her. Id.
at 1085. The product's container had apparently been thrown away soon after the
accident. Id. at 1086. The child's father sued the manufacturer of a product called
"Liquid-Plumr." Id. To establish identification the plaintiff presented witnesses who
testified that "Liquid-Plumr" was the product they had seen in the plaintiff's board-
ing house prior to the accident. Id. at 1086-87. The defendants argued that plain-
tiff's testimony as to the directions he followed in using the product conformed not to
the directions on the package containing the defendant's product, but rather con-
formed to the directions on a product known as "Mister Plumber." Id. at 1086. The
defendant also presented expert testimony to show that the rapidity with which the
drain cleaner burned the child's shirt indicated a chemical formula different from the
one for "Liquid-Plumr." Id. at 1087. The court, however, found that the plaintiff's
witnesses provided sufficient proof of identification for the plaintiff to meet his bur-
den. Id.
See also Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 525 F. Supp. 894, 905 (E.D. Va. 1979)
(insulation workers using asbestos-containing products did not have the benefit of the
manufacturers' warning labels once the products were taken from the boxes in which
they had been packaged), aft'd in part, vacated in part, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981).
75. See, e.g., McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730
(1978). The plaintiff in McCreegy brought a products liability action in negligence
and strict liability in tort against a single manufacturer of DES. She contended that
the DES her mother had ingested while pregnant had caused the plaintiff's vaginal
adenosis. Id. at 79-80, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 732. She admitted, however, that she could
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Each toxic substance obviously presents its own problems with
regard to product identification. It would seem, however, that plain-
tiffs whose exposure occurred in the workplace should have the easiest
time identifying the manufacturers and suppliers of the toxic sub-
stance to which they were exposed. Employers may have kept records
relating to the purchase of the toxic substance. Co-workers may re-
call the names of manufacturers or suppliers of materials. The em-
ployer's purchasing agent may recall from whom he purchased the
toxic substance. Absent such evidence, the degree of difficulty a
plaintiff may experience in identifying the manufacturer of the toxic
substance will be dictated to a large extent by the context in which he
was exposed. For example, in asbestos litigation many plaintiffs were
insulation workers who had worked daily with insulation products
containing asbestos. Some of these workers are able to remember the
specific types of asbestos products that they used and the names of the
manufacturers of those products.7 6 Other workers, however, may be
unable to recall the names of the products because their exposure to
asbestos had occurred only occasionally, or had occurred only after
not identify the manufacturer who supplied the DES her mother had taken, and
that, in fact, prior to the trial had assumed that Eli Lilly had been the only manufac-
turer of DES. Id. at 80-81, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33. The lower court had granted
the defendant's motion for a summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had
not met her burden of identification, and that decision was affirmed on appeal. Id. at
84, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 735. The court added that "[t]he establishment of the identity
of the tortfeasor is not one of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in negligence
actions that have been eliminated in strict products liability proceedings." Id.
See also Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978). In Gray,
the court stated that "[i]t is a fundamental principle of products liability law that a
plaintiff must prove, as an essential element of his case, that a defendant manufac-
turer actually made the particular product which caused injury". Id. (citing HURSH
& BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:41 (2d ed. 1974).
In the toxic tort context, several jurisdictions have relaxed the requirement that
the plaintiff identify that it was.the defendant's product which injured him. See, e.g.,
McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D. 1983). In McElhaney, the
plaintiff was suffering from vaginal cancer allegedly caused by DES. Id. at 266. She
brought suit against several manufacturers of DES, but could not identify which, if
any, of the defendants supplied the DES her mother had taken approximately 35
years prior to trial. Id. at 266. The court held that since all of the defendants had
acted negligently in supplying DES, and since it was almost certain that one or more
of the defendants had supplied the pharmacy which sold the DES to plaintiff's
mother, then the burden of proof was on the defendants to disprove identification.
Id. at 269-71.
For a more detailed discussion of judicial doctrines which ease a plaintiff's bur-
den of proof on the product identification issue, see notes 81-85 and accompanying
text infra.
76. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1102 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). In Borel, the plaintiff, who had worked with
asbestos products for 33 years, was able to present the names of many of the products
manufactured by the defendants as well as the dates and locations where he had used
them. Id.
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the asbestos had been unpackaged. This latter factual scenario is es-
pecially common for plaintiffs who did not handle asbestos products
themselves, but who worked in the same vicinity as pipe coverers or
insulators who were using products containing asbestos. Since this
kind of indirect exposure makes it almost impossible for those plain-
tiffs to identify personally either the manufacturers or the suppliers of
the asbestos product to which they were exposed, they will often rely
upon the testimony of co-workers who had direct contact with the
products. 77
It is interesting to note that because the number of witnesses who
are able to identify the manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos prod-
ucts is limited, several plaintiffs' law firms litigating asbestos cases
have developed stables of "product identification" witnesses. These
witnesses can identify products that were used, the general time pe-
riod when those products were used, and in some cases they can even
remember the specific products used on certain ships. Furthermore,
through depositions generated by the mass of asbestos litigation,
plaintiffs and defendants have learned the identities of most, if not all,
manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos products.
It is highly unlikely that plaintiffs in toxic tort situations other
than those involving asbestos will similarly have their burden of iden-
tifying the defendant eased. In DES cases, for example, plaintiffs
have an especially burdensome task in identifying the manufacturers
and suppliers of the DES which their mothers have ingested. Be-
tween 1947 and 1971, DES was administered to pregnant women in
order to prevent miscarriages. In 1971, researchers alleged a causal
relationship between in utero exposure to DES and certain rare forms
of cancer. The cancer-stricken offspring of women who used DES
during pregnancy may find it practically impossible to identify the
manufacturer or supplier of the DES taken by their mothers because,
in most instances, their mothers ingested the DES two or three de-
cades prior to the cancer's occurrence, and perhaps more importantly,
DES was manufactured and sold as a generic drug in such fashion
77. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex.
1981), rev'don other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). the Hardy court observed
that "the Fifth Circuit has accepted testimony of the worker and/or his co-workers of
use of a particular product as circumstantial evidence of producing cause such that
liability may be imposed on the manufacturer." Id. at 1358 (citations omitted). For
a further discussion of Hardy, see note 70 supra and notes 84 & 105 ihfra.
Dr. Selikoff, the distinguished medical authority on asbestos-related diseases, es-
timates that perhaps only one in 500 workers in private or naval shipyards was an
asbestos worker. He has pointed out, however, that because of the nature of shipyard
work, there was opportunity for exposure of the many other trades employed, even
though this might be only intermittent or indirect. Selikoff, Asbestos-Associated Dtsease,
in ASBESTOs-LITIGATION 39 (W. Alcorn ed. 1982).
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that even the dispensing pharmacist did not know what manufacturer
produced the actual DES that he was selling.
78
Plaintiffs alleging environmental exposure to a toxic substance
face even greater difficulties in identifying the supplier of the product.
If their exposure occurred as a result of local industrial activity, they
may be able to trace the injury-causing substance to a particular fac-
tory or landfill. This, however, does not necessarily alleviate the
plaintiff's burden of identifying the original supplier of the toxic sub-
stance. Records may have been destroyed, memories may have
lapsed, or there just may be too many potential toxic sources to per-
mit positive identification of the original supplier of the specific toxic
substance. The environmentally-exposed plaintiffs are thus likely to
be in a far worse position than the occupationally-exposed plaintiffs
when it comes to meeting their burden of identification.
In reaction to these problems of proof, some courts have devel-
oped theories of liability which ease the plaintiffs burden. One such
theory is the doctrine of alternative liability which shifts the burden
of proof on the question of causation to the defendants to exculpate
themselves. The alternative liability theory was first recognized in
the now famous case of Summers v. Tice. 79 In Summers, two hunters
negligently and simultaneously fired a shot across a highway. The
plaintiff was hit by one bullet but did not know from which one of the
hunters' weapons. Since both defendants had fired their weapons, the
court ruled that each defendant could exculpate himself only if he
proved that it was not his bullet which had injured the plaintiff.8 0 In
so ruling, the Summers court relieved the plaintiff of his burden of
identifying the particular defendant who caused his injury.
Another approach to easing the identification requirement is
provided by the theory of enterprise liability. Under this theory, a
plaintiff who is injured by exposure to, or by use of, a toxic substance,
but who cannot identify the specific manufacturer of the toxic sub-
stance which injured him, can recover from the entire industry the
damages that he has suffered.8 ' All the plaintiff need prove under
78. For a discussion of the identification problems inherent in DES lawsuits, see
notes 73 & 75 and accompanying text supra. Although there does not seem to be any
risk of cancer for DES-exposed sons, there have been a significant number of reports
of noncancerous abnormalities in these male offspring. Roberts & Royster, DES and
the Identification Problem, 16 AKRON L. REV. 447, 453 (1983).
79. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
80. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
81. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972). The plaintiffs in Hall were unable to identify the manufacturer of the alleg-
edly unsafe blasting caps which caused their injuries because the caps had been oblit-
erated by explosion. Id. at 359. The six defendants comprised virtually the entire
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this theory is that the manufacturer of the injury-causing product
cannot be specifically identified and that all manufacturers in the in-
dustry jointly controlled the risk associated with the product.8 2 Be-
cause of this "control" requirement, however, enterprise liability is
applicable only to industries in which there is a small number of
manufacturers.8 3
A variation of enterprise liability is the concept of market share
liability. Under the theory of market share liability, if a plaintiff al-
leges that he has been injured by a toxic product whose manufacturer
cannot be identified, each manufacturer or supplier who marketed
that toxic product will be held liable to the plaintiff in proportion to
its share of the market for the toxic product unless that defendant can
prove that it could not have been his product that caused plaintiffs
blasting cap industry, and plaintiffs showed that all of the defendants' caps were
manufactured according to standards set by their own trade association. Id. at 372.
Because it was impossible for plaintiffs to identify the defendant who actually caused
their injuries, the court formulated the enterprise liability theory. Under this theory,
the defendants could be liable in both negligence and strict liability for joint control
of the risk. Id. at 378. For additional discussion of Hall, see note 8supra. It should be
noted, however, that the theory of enterprise liability set forth by the Hall court was
never actually applied to the facts of that case because the court later severed and
transferred the actions after consideration of choice of law issues. Chance v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
The theory of enterprise liability should not be confused with the more tradi-
tional negligence doctrine of concerted action. Under the latter theory, the wrongdo-
ers join together in a common act or plan, the intent of which is to harm another.
The concert of action theory was employed in Btchler v. Eh'Lil4y &Co. to allow a DES
daughter to recover although she could not identify the manufacturer of the DES
that her mother had taken. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d
182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982). In Bichler, the plaintiff sued Eli Lilly for damages she
sustained as a result of the cancer she developed which was allegedly due to her
mother's ingetion of DES during pregnancy in 1953. Id. at 577-78, 436 N.E.2d at
184, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 778. Lilly was only one of 148 drug companies manufacturing
DES in 1953, and one of three who had supplied the pharmacy which filled the
plaintiff's mother's prescription in that year. Id. The court held that because the
plaintiff was suing only one manufacturer of the drug, her cause could not be sus-
tained under alternative liability, enterprise liability, or market share liability. Id. at
580, 436 N.E.2d at 185-86, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779-80. However, since the plaintiff had
presented evidence that an implied agreement existed between Lilly and other drug
companies to market DES without first conducting tests on pregnant mice, the court
held that the plaintiff could sue under a theory of concerted action. Id. at 583-84,
436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 782. The Bichler court concluded that the de-
fendant had either impliedly agreed to, or substantially assisted in, such an agree-
ment and therefore it could be held liable for the plaintiff's injury even if not
identified as the manufacturer responsible for the DES pills taken by plaintiff's
mother. Id. at 584-85, 436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
82. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
83. See id. ("[w]hat would be fair and feasible with regard to an industry of five
or ten producers might be manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized in-
dustry composed of thousands of small producers").
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injuries.8 4
Although alternative liability, enterprise liability, and market
share liability have been recognized in some jurisdictions under cer-
tain circumstances, these concepts have not been applied in Penn-
sylvania to toxic tort cases; a plaintiff must still prove that the
product of a particular defendant caused his injury.8 5 Consequently,
84. See Sindell v. Abott Laboratories, 25 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1980). The Sindell case was a class action brought by women against
manufacturers of DES to recover damages for injuries they received, allegedly as a
result of their mothers' ingestion of DES during pregnancy. Id. at 593-94, 607 P.2d at
925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Propounding its theory of market share liability, the
Si'dell court held that the plaintiffs did have a cause of action despite the fact that
they could not identify which, if any, of the defendants had supplied the drug to their
mothers. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court, relying in
part on the reasoning of Summers v. 7Yce, held that "a modification of the rule of
Summers is warranted." Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing
Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 80, 199 P.2d at 1). In explaining the reasons why it had
adopted the market share theory of liability, the Sindell court stated as follows:
In our contemporary complex industrial society, advances in science and
technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which
cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the courts can
be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those in-
jured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing
needs.
Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. For further discussion of the Sindell
case, see notes 8 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
The market share theory of liability has also been utilized in an asbestos-related
disease suit where the manufacturers of the asbestos products to which the workers
were exposed could not be identified. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509
F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1982). It was the opinion of the Hardy court that "[miarket share liability.., results
in apportionment [of damages] which bears some relationship to causative fault. Set-
ting aside the policy reasons for shifting the burden from the plaintiff to the defend-
ants, this is a compelling reason to apply a form of enterprise liability in the asbestos-
related litigation." Id. at 1358-59. For a further discussion of Hard see notes 70 & 77
supra and note 105 infra.
Other courts, however, have flatly rejected the market share theory of liability.
See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1018-19 (D.S.C. 1981) (rejecting
the market share theory of liability in DES suit by stating that application of this
theory "would violate established public policy and fundamental principles of tort
law").
85. See Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982). In
Prehck, the plaintiff brought a products liability action against numerous manufac-
turers and suppliers of asbestos products. Id. at 97. The plaintiff was able to identify
some of the defendants' asbestos-containing products, but was unable to identify
others. Id. In order to maintain a cause of action with regard to the unidentified
products supplied by the named defendants, the plaintiff asserted that all of the de-
fendants were proportionately liable under a theory of enterprise liability or market
share liability. Id. The district court stated that it did not have to predict whether
Pennsylvania would adopt Szhdell since that theory was inappropriate to the circum-
stances of the case subjudice. Id. at 98. The Prelick court then concluded that "where,
as here, the plaintiff is able to identify at least one manufacturer or supplier whose
product caused plaintiff's injury, the 'Sindell' or 'enterprise' theory is inapplicable."
Id. Cf In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (market
share theory of liability is inappropriate in a strict liability action where the plaintiffs
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the product identification defense can be especially advantageous for
a small supplier of a toxic substance whose name is not generally rec-
ognized. Unfortunately, this defense usually is unavailable to those
suppliers whose names are more easily remembered or those who
manufactured a variety of well-known products. For example, in as-
bestos cases almost every plaintiff seems to be able to recall the JM
logo such that product identification poses few problems for the as-
bestos litigant.
Since most products liability cases provide for joint and several
liability among the defendants, 86 product identification can be as
much a defendant's concern as it is a plaintiff's concern. Once a
plaintiff establishes that one defendant was the supplier of a sufficient
amount of a toxic substance to have been a substantial contributing
factor to his injuries, that defendant is liable for any award that the
jury makes. However, the original defendant will have contribution
or indemnity rights against his co-defendants. 87 For this reason, it is
in the interest of any defendant in a toxic tort case who has been
identified as a supplier of the toxic substance to aid in the identifica-
tion of other defendant/suppliers-a situation that presents some in-
teresting tactical considerations.
Asbestos litigation illustrates the tactical considerations which
confront defense counsel when a defendant's product has been identi-
are able to identify at least some of the defendants who had manufactured the asbes-
tos products that had allegedly caused injury).
86. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 291-323 (1971).
87. See, e.g., Migues v. Nicolet Indus., 493 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd n
part sub nom. Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981). Migues
involved the issue of defendants' liability for damages stemming from a wrongful
death action brought by the widow of an asbestos insulation worker. Id. at 61. The
worker had allegedly contracted mesothelioma as a result of asbestos exposure. Id.
The original action by the widow had been brought against 14 defendant-manufac-
turers. Id. In this action the defendants argued that each should be liable for only
1/14 of the damages that had been awarded. Id. at 64. The district court rejected
this argument, finding that all were jointly and severally liable. See 1d. at 64-65.
According to the Migues court, "[Ejach producer standing alone . . . [who] was
found to be a producing cause of a plaintiffis injury is liable for the total extent of the
harm. No statute or case authority exists for apportioning fault in this setting." Id.
at 64. For additional discussion of Migues, see notes 61 & 65 supra and note 121 injfa.
See also Ward v. McDan Dav. Leasing Corp., 340 F. Supp. 86 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aj'd
sub noma. Appeal of Balistreri, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), and aj'd sub nom. Denny
Leasing Co. v. McDan Dav. Leasing Corp., 485 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1973). Ward was a
suit arising out of a multicar accident which resulted in the death of the plaintiff's
husband. The district court in Ward found all of the defendants involved in the
accident to be jointly and severally liable. According to the court, the defendants
were joint tortfeasors and each was "responsible to the plaintiffs for the whole
amounts of their damages." Id. at 102. However, the court added that each defend-
ant was entitled to contribution from the other to the extent that one is called upon
to pay more than his proportionate share of the recovery. Id.
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fled by the plaintiff. In an asbestos-related disease case, a plaintiff
usually first introduces evidence that he has been exposed to the as-
bestos products of different defendants. The plaintiff then will pres-
ent medical testimony demonstrating that his exposure to asbestos
was a substantial contributing factor to his asbestos-related disease.
This evidence establishes plaintiff's prima facie case on medical cau-
sation and product identification.8 8 The identified defendants are
then faced with the quandry of whether to demonstrate that the
products of other, non-identified parties could have contributed to
plaintiff's injuries. If they fail to introduce such evidence, they will
have to pay the plaintiff's entire recovery if the plaintiff prevails in
the suit. However, if they do introduce such evidence, they incur the
risk that the size of the plaintiffs recovery might increase, and the
possibility that other available defenses-such as medical causation-
might become obfuscated.
Given these possibilities, the named defendants might consider
an alternative maneuver. Instead of implicating new defendants, the
identified defendants could make an agreement with non-identified
defendants to the effect that each of them will pay either a set per-
centage of the verdict or a specified dollar amount. This would en-
able those parties whose products have not been identified to pay a
lower share of any verdict than they would be forced to pay if they
were identified, while at the same time preventing the identified de-
fendants from being saddled with the entire award. Furthermore,
this arrangement allows the defendants to direct their attention to
other defenses. If the defendants can present a strong medical causa-
tion defense, an agreement not to implicate another's products would
allow the jury to focus its attention on the causation issue alone.
This kind of financial agreement also can be a factor in keeping
down the size of the damages award. 89 If, for example, it is shown
88. Under a traditional products liability cause of action, a plaintiff must meet
three essential requirements in order to establish his prima facie case. He must show
the following: 1) that the product is defective; 2) that the defect is attributable to the
defendant; and 3) that the defect caused his injury. See Note, Indust- Wide Liabiliy
13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980, 997 (1979).
In FlaUt v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., the court outlined the elements for which a
plaintiff has the burden of proof in asbestos-related disease cases based on strict liabil-
ity in tort. See 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980). Using the example of a plaintiff
claiming mesothelioma, the court stated that the plaintiff would have to prove the
following: 1) the defendants manufactured or supplied products containing asbestos;
2) products containing asbestos are unreasonably dangerous; 3) asbestos dust can be a
substantial contributing cause of mesothelioma; 4) plaintiff was exposed to defend-
ant's product; 5) the exposure was sufficient to be a producing cause of mesothelioma;
6) plaintiff contracted mesothelioma; and 7) plaintiff suffered damages. Id. at 838
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965)).
89. It is important to comprehend the costs involved in toxic tort litigation. In
12431982-1983]
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that the plaintiff was exposed to a variety of toxic substances, but
only one of these substances could be sufficiently identified for the
purposes of his claim, the jury may take this factor into consideration
in determining damages. That is, the jurors might be empathetic
toward a lone defendant whose products are identified, if they believe
that plaintiff's condition could have been caused in part by exposure
to toxic substances produced by unidentified manufacturers. This
tactical maneuver should be given consideration in any litigation in-
volving exposure to asbestos.
III. THE PRODUCT-RELATED DEFENSES
The matters previously discussed in this article-the statute of
limitations, medical causation, and product identification 9° -are de-
fenses to any toxic tort claim. The defenses discussed in the remain-
der of this paper are oriented toward toxic tort claims under the
rubric of products liability. The availability of these defenses will
vary according to the theory of liability alleged by a plaintiff. In a
personal injury situation, plaintiffs causes of action will generally be
framed in terms of breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability.
Of these, most plaintiffs normally proceed only in negligence and
strict liability, even though they may include breach of warranty
counts in their complaints. Because of the relative unimportance of
1980, for example, Johns-Manville alone disposed of 402 asbestos-related claims pay-
ing an average of $23,000 per suit in either settlement costs or damages to the plain-
tiffs. Surrick, supra note 73, at 290-91. In 1981, this corporation disposed of 1,463
cases for a total of approximately $22,678,000, or an average cost of $15,433 per case.
Id. Various estimates have been made as to the total amount of damages involved in
asbestos litigation. All of these estimates range in the billions of dollars. An insur-
ance company executive has suggested that present and future asbestos suits could
exceed $100 billion in damage claims. See Podgers, supra note 1, at 139. Another
commentator estimates that damages claimed in suits already filed exceed $24 bil-
lion. Schechter, Untangling the Asbestos Mess, 51 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY
30, 31, 39 (Feb. 1982). Furthermore, estimates do not include insurance fees paid by
manufacturers and suppliers.
As an example of the cost of defending these asbestos-related disease suts, be-
tween April 1, 1981 and January 11, 1982, Johns-Manville spent over $9 million in
administrative and defense costs for products liability claims. Surrick, supra note 73,
at 292. Since January of 1982, that corporation has paid an average of $1 million per
month for these costs. Id. The Defense Research Institute has estimated that the
total cost of the defense of asbestos cases now in litigation could exceed $300 million.
ASB. LITIG. REP. 4041 (March 12, 1982) (Andrew Pub.).
With DES litigation, it has been estimated that the national total of claimed
damages could reach $40 billion. At present, the minimum defense costs of each
DES case is approximately $50,000. Roberts & Royster, DES and the Identifiation
Problem, 16 AKRON L. REV. 447, 455 (1983).
90. For a more detailed description of these defenses, see notes 18-91 and accom-
panying text supra.
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the warranty theory in toxic tort cases,9 1 this discussion will focus pri-
marily on the negligence and strict liability theories of liability.
A. Defective or Unsafe Products
A plaintiff who brings a products liability/toxic tort action in
negligence will have to prove that defendant breached a duty owed to
him.92 In strict liability, the plaintiff must prove only that the prod-
uct itself was defective and that the defect caused his injury. 93 Under
91. A number of courts equate breach of implied warranty with strict liability in
tort and have concluded that a separate instruction on implied warranty is unneces-
sary. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 1969) (the
" 'defect' necessary for the imposition of strict liability is the equivalent of an implied
warranty of merchantability"); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126
(9th Cir. 1968) (difference between strict liability in tort and implied warranty "is
largely one of terminology"); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429
(N.D. Ind. 1965) (strict liability under § 402A "is hardly more than what exists under
implied warranty" except for the latter's requirements of privity, notice, and absence
of effective disclaimer); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965) (treating allegations in complaint with respect to implied warranty as suffi-
cient to state a cause of action for strict liability in tort); Goldberg v. Kollsman In-
strument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (1963)
(strict tort liability is "surely a more accurate phrase" than breach of implied
warranty).
Most plaintiffs in asbestos-related suits have been unsuccessful in asserting
causes of action under an implied warranty theory because in most instances there is
no privity between suppliers and the plaintiffs, who are often employees of the pur-
chasers. See, e.g., Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183, 191-92
(S.D. Ga. 1982); In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-41
(N.D. I1. 1981).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 328A (1965). Section 328A of the
Second Restatement describes a plaintiffs burden of proof in a negligence action as
follows:
In an action for negligence the plaintiff has the burden of proving
(a) facts which give rise to a legal duty on the part of the defendant
to conform to the standard of conduct established by law for the protection
of the plaintiff,
(b) failure of the defendant to conform to the standard of conduct,
(c) that such failure is a legal cause of the harm suffered by the plain-
tiff, and
(d) that the plaintiff has in fact suffered harm of a kind legally com-
pensable by damages.
Id.
93. See Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978). In
Gonzales, the plaintiff had asserted theories of defective design based both in negli-
gence and strict liability. In making its decision, the Texas Supreme Court discussed
the difference between the two causes of action:
The care taken by the supplier of a product in its preparation, manufacture,
or sale, is not a consideration in strict liability; this is, however, the ultimate
question in a negligence action. Strict liability looks at the product itself
and determines if it is defective. Negligence looks at the acts of the manu-
facturer and determines if it exercised ordinary care in design and
production.
Id. at 871. For further discussion of Go.nzales, see note 96 tnfra. See also Daly v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384
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either of these causes of action, the plaintiff will generally have three
theories by which to establish the defendant's liability. First, the
plaintiff can allege that the product was improperly manufactured. 9 4
An example of a manufacturing defect is a soda bottle which explodes
in a plaintiff's hands because, of a number of bottles, it alone had not
been made to the proper thickness. 95 Second, plaintiff can allege that
the product's design was unsafe. 96 The Ford Pinto cases illustrate this
(1978) (the requirement that the plaintiff's injury must have been caused by a defect
in the product is what prevents strict liability from being absolute liability).
94. See Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953) (exploding soda bottle
case brought in negligence); Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa. 176, 242 A.2d
231 (1968) (exploding soda bottle case brought under § 402A of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts). See also Clarke v. Brockway Motor Trucks, 372 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (evidence indicating a brake failure is sufficient to establish case for manu-
facturing defect under strict liability even where tangible proof of the defect is
unavailable).
95. See Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953). See also Bialek v.
Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa. 176, 242 A.2d 231 (1968). For further discussion of
Loch and Bialek, see note 94 supra.
96. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978). In Barker, the Supreme Court of California noted the basic distinction
between a manufacturing defect and a design defect:
[A] manufacturing or production defect is readily identifiable because a de-
fective product is one that differs from the manufacturer's intended result
or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line. . . . A
design defect, by contrast, cannot be identified simply by comparing the
injury-producing product with the manufacturer's plans or with other units
of the same product line, since by definition the plans and all such units will
reflect the same design.
Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
For examples of cases alleging design defect in a product, see Pennsylvania Glass
Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (under Penn-
sylvania law, a manufacturer can be held strictly liable for a design defect by failing
to install a fire suppression device in a loading vehicle; the device would not have
prevented the fire which caused the plaintiff harm, but it would have mitigated the
damages); Heckman v. The Federal Press Co., 587 F.2d 612, 614 (3d Cir. 1978) (man-
ufacturer's failure to provide an adequate safety device on a machine press can con-
stitute a design defect under § 402A). Cf. Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571
S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978) (although mere lack of an anti-skid safety feature on a trac-
tor step can be sufficient to find a defective design under § 402A, in negligence the
plaintiff must show that defendants' conduct in designing the tractor was culpable).
The malfunctioning product produces a hybrid of the manufacturing defect and
design defect theories. When a product malfunctions and injury results, a plaintiff
can argue that the harm occurred because the product must have been in some way
defective-either through a manufacturer's defect or a design defect. Thus, although
the plaintiff may be unable to demonstrate the precise defect (usually because an
accident has destroyed or severely damaged the product), he may contend that the
accident itself creates a presumption of defect. See, e.g., MacDougall v. Ford Motor
Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969) (when alleged malfunction in steering
mechanism caused plaintiff's car to go out of control, plaintiff's testimony as to the
difficulties in steering she had encountered just prior to the accident was sufficient to
create a reasonable inference of a defective condition).
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kind of claim.97 There, the plaintiffs alleged that although the auto-
mobile which caused their injuries had been properly manufactured,
the design of the Pinto was unsafe. 98 Finally, a plaintiff may allege
that the manufacturer failed to warn of the product's limitations,
thereby preventing the plaintiff from making an intelligent decision
about the use of the product.9 9 Most asbestos cases are based on this
theory.
Whether alleging manufacturing defect, design defect, or failure
to warn, the plaintiff suing in negligence must prove that the manu-
facturer or supplier of the product knew or had reason to know that
the product was likely to be dangerous, and that users of the product
were unaware of the dangers.i°° Thus, a plaintiff would argue that
the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care because he had
not detected the defect, he had not designed the product more safely,
or because he had not advised the user of the potential danger.
In strict liability pursuant to section 402A of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts, the plaintiff need only prove that the product was de-
fective and therefore dangerous, and that this defect caused his
97. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1981).
98. Id.
99. Breach of a duty to warn can arise in several ways. First, it may occur by a
failure to warn of a known danger. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399
F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (polio vaccine supplier failed to warn consumer of the risk of
contracting polio through the vaccine). Some courts will also find a breach where
there is a failure to warn of an unknown danger. For a discussion of this issue, see
note 108 and accompanying text infra. Finally, a supplier can be held liable for pro-
viding inadequate warnings or instructions. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow,
408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969) (a general warning of harmful side effects of a drug is
inadequate when a potentially severe side effect is not articulated).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). According to § 388 of
the Restatement,
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to
use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the
chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable
use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for
which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is likely to be dan-
gerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Id. Section 388 is often referred to as the "inherenty dangerous product provision."
One court has distinguished inherently dangerous products from defective products
as follows: "A product is inherently dangerous when the danger of injury stems from
the product itself, and not from any defect in it." General Bronze Corp. v. Kos-
topulos, 203 Va. 66, 71, 122 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1961) (citations omitted).
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injuries.' 0 Just as in negligence, a defect can be established because
of the way in which the product was manufactured, because of its
design, or because it did not contain adequate warnings or instruc-
tions for its use. 10 2 Under strict liability, however, the supplier may
be held liable even though he had exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product. 0 3
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For the text of
§ 402A, see note 8 supra.
102. In a negligence action for failure to warn, a defendant will often be able to
escape liability by demonstrating that it exercised all reasonable care in relaying
warnings of its product's risks. Thomas v. Arvon Prods. Co., 424 Pa. 365, 227 A.2d
897 (1967). In Thomas, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a varnish product for
negligently failing to exercise reasonable care in informing consumers of the prod-
uct's dangers. The plaintiff suffered blindness in one eye after he had applied a coat
of varnish to his employer's storage room. Id. at 367, 227 A.2d at 898. In a lawsuit to
recover damages for his injury, the plaintiff contended that the manufacturer had not
taken every reasonable precaution to insure that no harm would result from the use
of its products. See id. at 369-70, 227 A.2d at 899-900. The defendant responded with
evidence showing that it had placed warnings on the containers of the varnish and
that its representatives repeatedly had advised the plaintiff's employer of the need for
adequate ventilation when the varnish was being applied. Id. at 368, 227 A.2d at
899. The trial court found for the defendant and the supreme court affirmed con-
cluding that "every reasonable precaution that Arvon could take to insure no harm
resulted from the use of its product was taken." Id. at 370, 227 A.2d at 900.
103. See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). The
plaintiff in Azzarello had suffered injuries to his hand while operating a coating
machine manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 549, 391 A.2d at 1022. He brought
suit against the manufacturer on the theory of strict liability under § 402A. Id. at
550, 391 A.2d at 1022. The trial judge had instructed the jury that in order to find
the manufacturer liable under § 402A, it must be shown that the machine was "un-
reasonably dangerous." Id. at 551, 391 A.2d at 1022. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that the term "unreasonably dangerous" as used in § 402A has
"no independent significance and merely represent[s] a label to be used where it is
determined that the risk of loss should be placed upon the supplier." Id. at 556, 391
A.2d at 1025. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded, a plaintiff who is
injured by a product will have a cause of action under § 402A if he can show that
"the product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe
for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended
use." Id. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027. For a further discussion of Azzarelo, see notes 15
& 16 supra.
See also Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
In Berkebi'le, the plaintiffs husband had been killed in a helicopter crash. She
brought suit against the manufacturer of the helicopter under § 402A, arguing that
the manufacturer should be liable for defective design, manufacturing defect and
inadequate warning. Id. at 91-92, 337 A.2d at 897. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court took the opportunity in this case to clear up what appeared to it "a basic
confusion concerning the principles of strict liability in tort" among the courts in
Pennsylvania. Id. at 92, 337 A.2d at 898. Adominshing some courts for injecting
concepts of reasonableness and due care in the trial of a § 402A action, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court stated, "Strict liability requires, in substance, only two ele-
ments of requisite proof: the need to prove that the product was defective, and the
need to prove that the defect was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries." Id. at
93-94, 337 A.2d at 898. The court then went on to state that in order for a product
not to be in a defective condition, "[tihe seller must provide with the product every
element necessary to make it safe for use." Id. at 100, 337 A.2d at 902. For the text of
1248 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
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Very few toxic tort cases involve manufacturing defects. A toxic
substance may have harmful effects, but these effects are rarely
caused by some error or fluke in the manufacturing process. A manu-
facturing defect case involving a toxic substance could, however, oc-
cur in a situation where a toxic substance is mistakenly mixed into
another substance, such as processed food. ' 0 4 If the lot of food were
large enough, and the damage wrought extensive enough, a toxic tort
case premised on a manufacturing defect could be brought.
Similarly, very few toxic tort cases are based on allegations of
design defect. In design defect cases, the plaintiff must normally show
that there were feasible alternative manufacturing processes that
would render the product safer. Toxic substances such as benzine,
§ 402A of the Restatement, see note 8supra. For additional discussion of Berkebile, see
notes 132, 183 & 190 infra.
See Little v. PPG Indus., 92 Wash. 2d 118, 121-23, 594 P.2d 911, 913-14 (1979)
(failure to warn in strict liability is distinguished from negligent failure to warn in
that it is the inadequacy of the warning, not the conduct of the manufacturer, which
establishes strict liability). See also McDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super.
384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969). McDougall was a case involving an alleged mechanical
malfunction of an automobile. The court addressed itself to the difference between a
products liability action in negligence and one in strict liability:
The evidentiary requirements of negligence law demand proof that in-
jury is proximately caused by a specific defect in design or construction
because liability hinges upon whether the accident could have been avoided
by the exercise of reasonable care. In contrast, the concern of both § 402A
and warranty law is with the fitness of the product, not the conduct of the
producer as measured by due care. While proof of a mechanical malfunc-
tion does not support an inference of the absence of due care in the con-
struction or design of equipment, it is circumstantial evidence of the
unfitness of the equipment.
Id. at 391, 257 A.2d at 680.
104. See, e.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
828 (1942). In Decker, members of a family suffered serious illness, and in one in-
stance death, from eating contaminated sausage manufactured by Decker & Sons.
Id. at 610, 164 S.W.2d at 828. The plaintiff then brought an action in negligence
against the manufacturer. Id. At trial it was determined that the sausage had been
contaminated during the manufacturing process, and that this contamination was
the proximate cause of the injuries suffered. Id. at 611, 164 S.W.2d at 828. In its
review of this case, the Supreme Court of Texas held that a manufacturer should be
liable for injuries of the kind sustained in this case. Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
Noting that such liability was grounded in neither negligence nor breach of war-
ranty, the court opined that this form of liability is based "on the broad principle of
the public policy to protect human health and life." Id. According to the Decker
court,
[W]here food products sold for human consumption are unfit for that pur-
pose, there is such an utter failure of the purpose for which the food is sold,
and the consequences of eating unsound food are so disastrous to human
health and life, that the law imposes a warranty of purity in favor of the
ultimate consumer as a matter of public policy.
Id Cf. Athens Canning Co. v. Ballard, 365 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (pack-
ager of canned peas found liable for damages sustained by consumer who bit into a
burr which was allegedly in the peas).
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asbestos, or DES are inherently toxic. In order to prove a design de-
fect in products containing these substances, the plaintiff would have
to show that the products could have been manufactured with a sub-
stitute element which would have made the product safer and at the
same time maintained its effectiveness for its intended use.105
Most toxic tort cases are brought under the products liability
doctrine of failure to warn. 10 6 Pennsylvania has adopted sections 388
and 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts.' 0 7 These sections pro-
vide that a supplier of a product has a duty to warn of any dangers
posed by the product of which the user could not reasonably be ex-
pected to know. Any product, therefore, which has a danger not com-
monly known must be accompanied by a warning alerting the user to
its potential hazards. 0 8
105. For example, the heat resistant property of asbestos is of great utility to
industrial society, and it is difficult to find a suitable replacement that is as effective.
In the United States alone, industry consumes one million tons of asbestos. Hardy v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 681 F.2d
334 (5th Cir. 1982).
106. For additional discussion of the failure to warn theory, see note 99 and
accompanying text supra. For an analysis of the issues regarding the adequacy of
warnings in strict liability in tort, see The Duty to Warn and Strict Liabihty, 48 INS.
COUNS. J. 391 (1981); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of
Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 495 (1976).
107. See Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). For a discussion of
Webb v. Zem and for the text of § 402A, see note 8 supra.
For the text of § 388 of the Second Restatement, see note 100 supra. For an
application of § 388 to a products liability action, see Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
108. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The Fifth Circuit in Borel noted that the
plaintiff "did not know that inhaling asbestos dust could cause serious illness until his
doctors advised him in 1969 that he had asbestosis." Id. at 1093. Because the defend-
ant manufacturers had failed to warn the plaintiff/user of a danger not known to
him, they were held liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Id. Three of the Borel defend-
ants had, however, in the 1960's included warnings on their products stating that
inhalation of asbestos "may be harmful." Id. at 1104. The court found such warn-
ings wholly inadequate since they failed to state both the kind of harm and the grav-
ity of the harm that asbestos can cause. Id.
A product that contains a hazard unknown to the user, must contain a warning
on the product that is found by the court to be "adequate." For examples of warnings
that courts have deemed inadequate, see Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540
F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1976) (manufacturer's warning held inadequate because it did not
specify the gravity of harm or the kind of harm posed by the product) (manufacturer
could not rely on others to communicate sufficient warnings); Reyes v. Wyeth Labo-
ratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (where a supplier of polio vaccine could rea-
sonably foresee that vaccinations would' be administered through mass
immunizations, a warning which was directed only to physicians held inadequate;
the supplier had a duty to warn those vaccinated), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965) (warning on an
insecticide that did not contain symbolic characters to convey the poisonous nature
of product held inadequate since manufacturer had reason to foresee insecticide's use
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In a products liability action, proof on the issue of whether the
defendant failed to warn the plaintiff adequately is straightforward.
The litigants will focus on several questions. Did the product pose to
its users potential health hazards which the manufacturer knew or
should have known and which the user could not reasonably be ex-
pected to have known? Was the sale of the potential injurious prod-
uct accompanied by a warning alerting the user to the product's
potential danger? If so, was the warning adequate to alert the user of
the product to the potential danger? Assuming that the manufac-
turer gave no warning as to the potential dangers or that the warning
given was inadequate, liability could be imposed on the manufacturer
because the product as sold was defective, or because the manufac-
turer, by selling the product absent a warning, had breached his duty
of care.
B. Duty to Warn/State of the Art
The term "state-of-the-art" refers to the skill, experience, and
knowledge of a particular scientific or manufacturing community at a
particular point in time. Knowledge, experience, and technology in
any industry progresses over time and consequently, a "state-of-the-
art" that existed decades ago, when measured by present understand-
ing, may seem to be antiquated, out-dated, and perhaps, primitive.
The state-of-the-art defense is based upon the proposition that any
alleged defect in a product can be analyzed only on the basis of the
knowledge, expertise, and technology available at the time of the
product's manufacture and, therefore, that a manufacturer is only ob-
ligated to warn of dangers that are known or knowable at the time of
a product's manufacture and not those dangers that may become evi-
dent decades later.109
The state-of-the-art defense is especially important in toxic tort
litigation because of the long latency periods associated with many
toxic tort injuries. Mesothelioma, for example, has an average la-
by illiterate or foreign-speaking laborers); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79
(4th Cir. 1962) (manufacturer held to anticipate the home environment in which the
furniture polish would be used so as to determine of what risks or misuses should be
warned) (product's warning, "harmful if swallowed, especially by children" was in-
sufficient to alert the user to the product's lethal dangers).
109. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 418, 307
A.2d 449 (1973) (since thrombophlebitic conditions were not known to be a side ef-
fect of the manufacturer's oral contraceptive at time of its manufacture, manufac-
turer could not be held liable for failure to warn of such a condition). For practical
insights on use of state-of-the-art evidence by a litigating attorney, see Robb,A Practi-
cal Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability Cases, 77 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1 (1972); Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products
Liability, 67 MINN. L. REV. 343 (1982).
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tency period of approximately thirty to forty years. Asbestosis has a
similarly long latency period. The defense is also important because a
number of jurisdictions have carved discovery rule exceptions into
their statutes of limitations. The discovery rule in this context means
that a plaintiff who was exposed to asbestos in the 1940's, but did not
develop symptoms of mesothelioma until 1980, can bring a cause of
action against the manufacturer of the asbestos-containing product in
1982. Assume that this plaintiff has brought his suit within the limi-
tations period and that his complaint is based on the defendant's fail-
ure to warn of the dangers associated with asbestos products. The
state-of-the-art defense would permit the defendant to argue that
when he sold the asbestos products, in the 1940's, he did not know,
nor could he have known, that asbestos caused mesothelioma. If this
defense were successful and plaintiff were unable to show that the
manufacturer should have been aware of the product's dangers, lia-
bility would not be imposed upon the defendant.
Since the state-of-the-art defense is grounded only in the actual
knowledge that the manufacturer should have had, this defense is
clearly admissible in an action brought in negligence. In a negligence
action brought under a failure to warn theory, the sole question is
whether the defendant, by not warning the plaintiff of the hazards
associated with the defendant's product, failed to exercise reasonable
care. To answer this question, evidence must be presented on
whether there was knowledge relating to the harmfulness of the de-
fendant's product which was available to the industry at the time the
product was manufactured. 10
Courts have struggled, however, with the issue of the admissibil-
ity of the state-of-the-art defense in actions based on strict liability.
Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts imposes liability on
the manufacturer notwithstanding his exercise of "all possible care in
the preparation and sale of the product.""' Comment j of section
402A, however, is similar to the negligence standard in its description
of a failure to warn claim. It states that a seller is required to warn if
110. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204, 447 A.2d
539, 546 (1982) (state-of-the-art is a negligence defense). See also Glover v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 525 F. Supp. 894, 904 (E.D. Va. 1979) (under a negligence standard,
the duty to warn of the dangers of asbestos products attached when manufacturer
had actual knowledge of the significant health hazards posed by its products), aJid in
part, vacated in part, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See also Webb v. Zern,
422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (under § 402A, the fact that a beer distributor
exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of a keg of beer does not in itself
free him from liability for the plaintiff's injuries caused by the explosion of the keg).
For additional discussion of Webb v. Zern, see note 8 supra & note 124 ztfra.
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he knows or "by the application of reasonable, developed human skill
and foresight" should have known of the product's dangerous propen-
sities.112 Furthermore, comment k of 402A acknowledges that there
are certain products which, although potentially dangerous to a user,
are both incapable of being made safer and are of great value to soci-
ety. Thus, so long as such "unavoidably unsafe products" bear a
proper warning as to their hazards, strict liability will not attach to
the manufacturer for any harm caused by them.' 3 It would appear,
then, that while section 402A imposes strict liability, comments j and
k attempt to limit a manufacturer's liability in failure to warn cases to
only those dangers about which he knew or could have known at the
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). Comment
j of § 402A states that "[i]n order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container,
as to its use." Id.
113. Id. § 402A comment k. Comment k of § 402A states that products which
are incapable of being made safe for their intended use but which have great societal
value, are, if properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and warnings,
neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous. Id. Typically, such unavoidably un-
safe products are often "new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of
time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of
safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justi-
fies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
Id. For products of this type, comment j provides in pertinent part that
[t]he seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are prop-
erly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situa-
tion calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to sup-
ply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended
with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id.
Dean Wade has observed that where an unavoidably unsafe product is made as
it is intended, the risk of an idiosyncratic reaction is not a "defect" at all. Wade, Strlit
Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 14 (1965). Thus, the only § 402A ques-
tion that arises regarding such products is whether they are "unreasonably danger-
ous," not whether they are in a "defective condition." Id.
Others suggest that unavoidably unsafe products can be defective if not accom-
panied by an adequate warning. Consequently, in Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit held that a manufacturer of a polio vaccine could be found liable in a
§ 402A action for failing to warn of the statistical risk that one person in a million
would contract polio from taking the vaccine. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399
F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
It is important to understand the distinction between "unavoidably unsafe"
products and products which are "unreasonably dangerous". The Fifth Circuit has
suggested that in order to differentiate the two categories, a two-part analysis should
be employed. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). The court must first inquire whether the product is so
unsafe that marketing it at all is "unreasonably dangerous per se." Id. Such a deter-
mination would include considerations of the gravity of the risks and the product's
utility. Id. Secondly, if the product is held not to be dangerous per se, the issue is
"whether the product has been introduced into the stream of commerce without suffi-
cient safeguards and is thereby 'unreasonably dangerous as marketed.' " Id. (quoting
Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information 48 TEX. L. REV. 399, 406 (1970)).
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time the product was made. These two standards of liability are not
easily reconciled, and therein lies the courts' struggle with the state-
of-the-art defense.
Those courts which have rejected state-of-the-art as a defense to
a strict liability action have done so on the basis of social policy. Pre-
eminent among the policies articulated is the "deep pockets" rational-
ization of comment c of section 402A. This argument maintains that
since manufacturers are in a better position to insure against liability
and to pass the cost of damages on to the consuming public, strict
liability should disregard any issues concerning a manufacturer's fault
or knowledge.' 1 4 According to the courts that reject the state-of-the-
art defense in strict liability actions, as between two innocent parties,
the manufacturer is seen as having the better opportunity to discover
and correct or warn of the defect; therefore, the manufacturer should
pay the costs of the harm caused by its product.' 15 Those jurisdic-
tions that do recognize the state-of-the-art defense in strict liability
actions have based their rulings primarily upon comments j and k of
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965). Ac-
cording to comment c of § 402A of the Second Restatement, one justification for
strict liability is "that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market
them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be
obtained . . . ." Id.
115. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982). In Beshada, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that in strict liability "cul-
pability is irrelevant. The product was unsafe. That it was unsafe because of the
state of technology does not change the fact that it was unsafe." Id. at 204, 447 A.2d
at 546.
The Beshada court rested its decision to strike the state-of-the-art defense in
§ 402A actions on three policy considerations. The first is that strict liability in tort is
grounded in the concept of risk spreading which proposes that "manufacturers and
distributors of defective products can best allocate the costs of the injuries resulting
from those products." Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547. Second, the court stated that
elimination of state-of-the-art evidence might provide manufacturers with a greater
incentive to produce safer products. Id. at 207, 447 A.2d at 547-48. Finally, the
Beshada court noted that analyses relating to scientific and technological knowledge
tend to be so complicated as to create "vast confusion" in the judicial factfinding
process. d. at 207-208, 447 A.2d 458. For a further discussion of Beshada, see note
110 supra.
Although Beshada is a seemingly unequivocal rejection of the state-of-the-art de-
fense in strict liability, the strength of that holding has been called into question in a
recent decision by the New Jersey Superior Court. See Feldman v. Lederle Laborato-
ries, 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (1983). The Feldman court held that the
Beshada approach is inapplicable to cases involving pharmaceuticals. Id. at 428-29,
460 A.2d at 205. The Feldman court stated as follows:
The underlying reason for special exemption of prescription drugs is the
public policy concern that imposition of the strict liability or, perhaps more
accurately stated, the almost absolute liability, principle of Beshada ap-
proach would chill if not smother the research, development, production
and marketing of new or experimental drugs necessary to alleviate or cure
the ills to which we are all subject.
1254 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
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section 402A and on the social policy underlying those comments., 1 6
Positing the example of certain medical drugs whose potential dan-
gers are unknowable or undetectable, these jurisdictions emphasize
the overriding benefit that such drugs afford society. To impose lia-
bility on manufacturers for failing to warn of dangers about which
they could not have known would be to deter future research and
development of new and socially beneficial drugs, and consequently,
would be in direct contravention of a public policy favoring medical
and scientific progress.' 17
It is submitted that comments j and k specifically provide for the
use of the state-of-the-art defense in strict liability actions. Courts
that disallow this defense have, for all practical purposes, disregarded
these comments in interpreting section 402A, and have thus removed
Id. If the Feldman decision is ultimately approved by the New Jersey Supeme Court,
it would be a clear retrenchment from the harsh principle set forth in Beshada.
See also Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. ,Supp. 836, 841 (E.D. Tex.
1980) (in a strict liability action brought against asbestos suppliers, defendants "are
not entitled to and will not present" state-of-the-art evidence since it is "immaterial"
to a strict liability proceeding).
116. See, e.g., Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1977) (strict
liability is grounded in the question of whether drug manufacturers disclosed in their
warnings all the side effects "which they knew or should have known at the time
these effects were discovered"); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d
155, 159 (8th Cir. 1975) (a manufacturer of asbestos-containing products is required
only "to give adequate warnings of known or knowable dangers"); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973) (in strict liability
action for failure to warn of the hazards of asbestos, defendant is liable for failure to
give adequate warnings of the "known or knowable dangers involved"), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329, 333 (E.D. Mo.
1980) (state-of-the-art evidence is "obviously relevant" to the issue of asbestos manu-
facturer's liability for failure to warn); Tomer v. American Home Prods. Corp., 170
Conn. 681, 687, 368 A.2d 35, 38 (1976) (drog manufacturer's duty to warn "was
dependent upon the state of knowledge" concerning Halothane at the time the
breach of duty was alleged to have occurred); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,
532 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1975) (under § 402A supplier of polio vaccine had a duty
to warn of the risk of contracting polio since this risk was knowable at the time of
sale).
For further discussion of the content of comments j and k of § 402A, see notes
112-13 and accompanying text supra.
117. See Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 418, 307
A.2d 449 (1973). In 1973, the Pennsylvania Superior Court discussed some of the
social policy considerations which support the use of the state-of-the-art defense in
products liability actions:
In no reported case has a court imposed liability on a prescription drug
manufacturer on the basis of facts or discoveries made subsequent to the
date a particular cause of action accrued. To do so would be to fatally
choke the industry in its marketing and development procedures. A drug
manufacturer would virtually become an insurer against all possible conse-
quences, which at some future date prove to be "caused" by the use of its
product. It would cause drug companies to hesitate and prolong the time
before precious, beneficial, and long-awaited drugs 'were put on the market.
Id. at 433, 307 A.2d at 449.
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a very important limitation on a manufacturer's liability. Further-
more, equitable, economic, and logical considerations mandate the
application of the state-of-the-art defense-especially in toxic tort
cases. The long latency periods associated with many toxic tort inju-
ries, coupled with the discovery rule exception, leave a manufacturer
wholly vulnerable to lawsuits absent a state-of-the-art defense. A
manufacturer may find himself sued for acts or omissions he commit-
ted without fault decades ago and years before any jurisdiction even
adopted section 402A. Because of the long latency period associated
with many toxic tort injuries and the lack of an effective statute of
repose, a defendant in a jurisdiction that does not permit the state-of-
the-art defense may find himself being sued for actions that occurred
decades ago, but precluded from defending on the basis that at the
time the products were sold no one could know of any danger associ-
ated with the products. This patent unfairness was not within the
contemplation of the American Law Institute when it drafted this
section. The drafters, through comments j and k of section 402A,
were careful to provide limits to a manufacturer's exposure for liabil-
ity so as not to set forth a theory of absolute liability. Courts that
adopt the position that state-of-the-art evidence is improper in a strict
liability action endorse a legal principle that holds a defendant liable
for failing to do today what is impossible to do today, tomorrow, or
even a decade from now.
To appreciate the economic consequence of abolishing the state-
of-the-art defense, one need only look to the area of asbestos litiga-
tion. Over 25,000 lawsuits already have been filed against asbestos
producers, suppliers, and sellers."18 Three manufacturer/suppliers of
asbestos-containing products have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy." 19
Courts, overwhelmed by the enormity of the asbestos suits, have
adopted special procedures for dealing with these cases,' 20 and legisla-
118. As of January 1982, Johns-Manville Corporation faced over 14,000 law-
suits with that number increasing at a rate of 530 per month. Nicolet, Inc., another
manufacturer of asbestos products, was a defendant in 5,600 asbestos-related suits
involving more than 8,000 plaintiffs by the beginning of 1982, while Raybestos-Man-
hattan, Inc. faced approximately 5,375 pending asbestos-related lawsuits in the be-
ginning of 1981. See Surrick, supra note 72, at 289-90.
119. In addition to Johns-Manville's petition under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act, Unarco Industries, and Amatex have also filed for reorganization
under Chapter 11. Surrick, supra note 72, at 301. For additional discussion regarding
the Chapter 11 petition of Johns-Manville, see note 5 supra.
120. For example, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas has initiated a spe-
cial compulsory non-jury program for asbestos cases. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v.
Bradley, 499 Pa. 291, 293-94, 453 A.2d 314, 315 (1982). All such cases are first tried
without a jury. See id. The parties then have an automatic right to appeal from the
non-jury verdict and are entitled to a jury trial de novo. Id. at 295, 953 A.2d at 315.
Various parties have objected to this system. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sanc-
1256 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
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tures throughout the country are contemplating laws that would re-
move asbestos-related claims from the arena of general litigation
altogether.' 2' These economic and judicial dislocations are only the
tip of the iceberg; compared to the number of asbestos-related law-
suits that have already been disposed of, thousands more are awaiting
disposition. 22 Actions involving toxic substances other than asbestos
pose equally ominous consequences to the economy and to the judi-
cial system.
Even disregarding economic consequences and concerns over the
unfairness to manufacturers resulting from the abrogation of this de-
fense, an approach to strict liability for toxic torts that precludes the
use of the state-of-the-art defense simply is not logical. Obviously, a
product that is sold without proper warning of possible hazards or
limitations may be defective. However, to require a manufacturer to
draft warnings of all dangers known, unknown, and unknowable is to
assure a host of meaningless, overbroad warnings that might not be
heeded. Such warnings, if they were to include every imaginable po-
tential danger, could not be specific. Moreover, these warnings would
lack the immediacy of warnings that society has come to expect for
products that are genuinely dangerous. As a result, plaintiffs who
had been warned of a product's known and potential dangers could
contend that the warning was inadequate because it lacked immedi-
acy: that is, the product bore so many warnings that the user was
both overwhelmed and desensitized by their content. At the same
time, a party who was injured as a result of a danger in the product
that was unknown at the time of manufacture could argue-just as
plaintiffs do now-that the broad warning referring to possible
tioned the compulsory non-jury program specifically for asbestos-related disease cases
because of the enormity of the litigation pending in the Philadelphia Court of Com-
mon Pleas. Id. at 294, 453 A.2d at 315. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.2 (West
1984) (one-year statute of limitations to be applied to asbestos-related personal injury
claims).
121. See generally Asbestos Legal 'Tdal Wave'Is Closing In, 68 A.B.A. J. 397 (1982).
122. In 1980, the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas noted that as of
that date, some 2,445 plaintiffs had filed claims against asbestos manufacturers.
Migues v. Nicolet Indus., 493 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd in part sub nom.
Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1981).
On year later the New York Times estimated that 12,000 asbestos-related lawsuits
had been filed in federal and state courts and that new lawsuits were being filed at a
rate of 400 per month. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
In 1982, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted the "emergence and explosion
of asbestos-related litigation throughout the country." Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v.
Bradley, 499 Pa. 291, 294 453 A.2d 314, 315 (1982). The court pointed out that as of
December, 1982, over 16,000 asbestos cases had been filed nationwide. Id. Philadel-
phia, which has experienced the third largest number of asbestos-related case filings
in the country, had 1,850 cases pending, with new cases being filed at the rate of
approximately 75 per month. Id.
1982-19831 1257
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hazards was inadequate because it lacked specificity. Thus, courts
that seek to impose a duty upon a manufacturer to warn of things
unknowable at the time of sale are invoking a legal fiction that not
only flies in the face of our traditional system of jurisprudence, but
also places defendants in a no-win situation.
Policy considerations regarding the state-of-the-art defense need
to be examined closely. Strict liability is often justified on the
grounds that a manufacturer is the party in the best situation to esti-
mate the cost of its products liability exposure and to incorporate that
cost into the price of its products. However, in cases involving un-
known or unknowable dangers, that rationale has no application.
Since the manufacturer does not know that its product is hazardous,
it cannot estimate the scope of liability in order to obtain adequate
insurance. This is especially true for a manufacturer who sells what
may appear to be a relatively innocuous product with widespread
use. To disallow the state-of-the-art defense, then, is not necessarily
to assure future plaintiffs of compensation for their injuries.
The abrogation of the state-of-the-art defense in strict liability
actions is also said to promote the production of safer goods, which
should in turn reduce the number of product-related injuries. How-
ever, when a manufacturer is held liable for hazards that could not
have been known at the time of the sale, he may simply withhold his
products from sale altogether. Alternatively, he may engage in un-
necessary testing that will significantly delay the product's introduc-
tion into the market. As Dean Prosser has noted, while encouraging
manufacturers to withhold socially desirable products from the mar-
ketplace may result in fewer lawsuits, it may not be in the best inter-
est of society as a whole. 123
Courts disallowing state-of-the-art evidence in strict liability
toxic tort actions often justify their holdings by arguing that to permit
such evidence is tantamount to making strict liability the equivalent
of negligence. They maintain that the state-of-the-art defense would
permit a defendant to shift the jurors' attention from the product-
the proper focus in a strict liability action-to the conduct of the de-
123. W. PROSSER, supra note 86, § 99, at 661. Addressing the issue of whether
strict liability should be imposed upon manufacturers of unavoidably dangerous
products, such as pharmaceutical drugs, Dean Prosser has stated that
the argument that industries producing potentially dangerous products
should make good the harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add the
cost to the price of the product, encounters reason for pause, when we con-
sider that two of the greatest medical boons to the human race, penicillin
and cortisone, both have their dangerous side effects, and that drug compa-
nies might well have been deterred from producing and selling them.
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fendant, which is the proper subject of the jury's focus in a negligence
action. This reasoning, however, oversimplifies the concept of strict
liability. One of the primary purposes for adopting strict liability as a
theory of recovery was to make parties in the chain of distribution
other than the manufacturer liable to a plaintiff. In negligence, a
plaintiff has a nearly impossible burden of proof when he sues retail-
ers, distributors, and sellers. Such distributors bear a very limited
duty to a plaintiff since they usually are not in a position to inspect or
because they lack the expertise to inspect the products they sell. 124
Strict liability was intended to simplify a plaintiffs burden of proof as
to defendants who are retailers, distributors, and sellers; it was not
intended to eliminate completely the plaintiffs burden of proof as to
the manufacturer.
More importantly, use of the state-of-the-art defense in strict lia-
bility actions does not convert this theory of liability into a form of
negligence. The line between these two theories is not blurred by ad-
mitting state-of-the-art evidence because the two theories do not use
the same standard for judging the liability of a manufacturer. For
example, in negligence actions a manufacturer is held to the standard
of a reasonable man or manufacturer. 25 Consequently, a jury in a
negligence action might determine that a manufacturer, although un-
aware of knowable hazards, 26 was nevertheless reasonable and there-
fore not liable. By contrast, under a strict liability theory a
manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert.127 In addition, in a
124. See, e.g., Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (distributor of a
beer keg which exploded not liable in negligence action because it did not have ex-
clusive control over the handling of the keg).
One commentator has described the limited duty that a dealer in chattels owes
under a negligence standard:
In the absence of some special reason to suspect that something is wrong, it
is clear that the obligation of the dealer does not extend to the opening of
sealed containers, or to taking the goods apart, or to making mechanical or
chemical tests; and it is entirely possible that reasonable precaution will
require no inspection at all where the goods are purchased from a reputable
manufacturer, there appears to be no occasion for it, and it would normally
be regarded as unnecessary. Certainly much less is required of the dealer
than of the manufacturer.
W. PROSSER, supra note 86, § 95, at 633.
125. See W. PROSSER, supra note 123, § 96, at 644. According to Dean Prosser,
the standard of care that a seller or manufacturer must exercise is "the care of a
reasonable man under the circumstances." Id.
126. See Keeton, Products Liability-Problems Pertaining to Proof of Negligence , 19 Sw.
L.J. 26 (1965). Under a negligence standard, there may be a variety of acceptable
reasons why a particular manufacturer was unaware of its product's hazards, includ-
ing the fact that the manufacturer was not especially sophisticated. Id. at 28-29.
127. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The Borel court, recognizing the state-of-the-art
principle that strict liability because of failure to warn is based on a determination of
1982-19831 1259
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strict liability action, if any knowledge of a product's dangers existed
at the time of the product's sale, such knowledge is imputed to the
manufacturer who then would be held liable under a failure to warn
theory. This knowledge also is imputed to all sellers and suppliers of
the product.' 28 Because negligence and strict liability theories em-
body different standards, use of the state-of-the-art defense in both
will not cause these theories to merge, as some courts have feared.
The state-of-the-art defense is invaluable to defendants in the
toxic tort arena. For example, asbestos suits brought today often al-
lege failure to warn of the hazards of asbestos three or four decades
ago. In today's highly technological and interdependent social net-
work, any number of substances, the toxicity of which is as yet un-
known, can harm thousands of people over substantial periods of
time. To hold manufacturers of such substances responsible for pres-
ently unknowable knowledge is to invite economic and legal havoc. 129
the manufacture's knowledge, cautioned nevertheless that "the manufacturer is held
to the knowledge and skill of an expert." Id. at 1089. This means, the court contin-
ued, "that at a minimum he must keep abreast of scientific knowledge, discoveries,
and advances and is presumed to know what is imparted thereby." Id.
128. According to comment f of § 402A, strict liability is applicable
to any person engaged in the business of selling products for use or con-
sumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to
any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a restau-
rant. It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the business of
selling such products.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965). Comment j of
§ 402A imputes knowledge to the seller of a product if he should have known of a
product's dangers. Id. § 402A comment j. Consequently, these two provisions read
together indicate that sellers and suppliers as well as manufacturers will have knowl-
edge of a product's defects imputed to them if they should have known of the prod-
uct's defect. See, e.g., Shoppers World v. Villarreal, 518 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (although defendant retailer not liable in negligence for injuries caused by
leaky container since he had no duty to inspect it, defendant is liable under § 402A
because there was a defect which caused injury). It should be noted, however, that
§ 402A applies only to "ordinary sellers" of a product, not to occasional or one-time
sellers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965). See also
McKenna v. Art Pearl Works, Inc., 225 Pa. Super. 362, 366, 310 A.2d 677, 680 (1973)
(since defendant was not in the business of selling the machinery which caused plain-
tiff's injury, liability under § 402A does not attach).
129. See Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 I11. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980). In
Woodill, the plaintiff was suing in strict liability the manufacturer of a drug, Pitocin,
for failing to warn of the drug's hazards. Id. at 29, 402 N.E.2d at 195. The plaintiff
had been injected with the drug in order to induce labor. Id. Subsequently her child
was born with quadriplegia, blindness, and brain damage. Id. The Illinois Supreme
Court remanded the case after presenting a lengthy dissertation in favor of allowing
state-of-the-art evidence in strict liability actions. The Woodill court stated as follows:
[R]equiring a plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant manufacturer
knew or should have known of the danger that caused the injury, and that
the defendant manufacturer failed to warn plaintiff of that danger, is a rea-
sonable requirement, and one which focuses on the nature of the product
and on the adequacy of the warning, rather than on the conduct of the
[Vol. 28: p. 12081260
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Because the availability of the state-of-the are defense has not been
conclusively resolved in most jurisdictions, it is an issue that should be
raised at the outset, and preserved for appellate review, in any trial
involving toxic substances.
C. Proximate Cause
In any personal injury suit, a plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant's actions were the proximate cause of his injuries. To a large
extent this involves questions of medical causation. However, where
a plaintiff brings a products liability action in either negligence or
strict liability, he must prove not just that the defendant's products
caused his injuries, but that the specifically alleged defect in the prod-
uct caused them.13 0 For example, a plaintiff was exposed to asbestos
manufacturer. The inquiry becomes whether the manufacturer, because of
the "present state of human knowledge," knew or should have known of the
danger presented by the use or consumption of a product. Once it is estab-
lished that knowledge existed in the industry of the dangerous propensity of
the manufacturer's product, then the plaintiff must establish that the de-
fendant did not warn, in an adequate manner, of the danger.
Id. at 35, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
The Woodill court further stated,
[O]ur holding in this case is justified because a logical limit must be placed
on the scope of a manufacturer's liability under a strict liability theory. To
hold a manufacturer liable for failure to warn of a danger of which it would
be impossible to know based on the present state of human knowledge
would make the manufacturer the virtual insurer of the product, a position
rejected by this court . . . . Strict liability is not the equivalent of absolute
liability. There are restrictions imposed upon it. For example, we have
previously held that where an injury is not foreseeable, that is, objectively
predictable, no liability will ensue based on strict liability. Also, where the
plaintiff knows of the risk of injury presented by the use of a dangerously
defective product but assumes the risk nonetheless, the manufacturer is ab-
solved from liability.
This court is acutely aware of the social desirability of encouraging the re-
search and development of beneficial drugs. We are equally aware that
risks, often grave, may accompany the introduction of these drugs into the
marketplace. We simply think, however, in accordance with comments j
and k of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that where
liability is framed by the manufacturer's duty to warn adequately of dan-
gers which may arise from the use of a drug, that liability should be based
on there being some manner in which to know of the danger. Otherwise the
warning itself, which is the focus of the liability, would be a meaningless
exercise.
Id. at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 199 (citations omitted).
130. See W. PROSSER, supra note 86, § 103, at 671-72. As Dean Prosser has ob-
served, in negligence, warranty or strict liability actions the plaintiff must prove three
things. d. § 103, at 671. First, the plaintiff must prove he was injured by the prod-
uct. Id. Second, he must prove that the injury occurred because the product was
defective or unreasonably unsafe. Id. § 103, at 672. And third, the plaintiff must
prove that the defect existed when it left the hands of the defendant. Id.
54
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 6 [1983], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss6/7
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
while working at the Philadelphia Naval Yard from 1940 until 1945.
In 1980 he is diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis and brings a law-
suit against the shipyard's suppliers of asbestos-containing products,
alleging a failure to warn. In a negligence or strict liability action,
the fact that asbestos caused his asbestosis will not be sufficient to
warrant the imposition of liability. The jury must also find that the
asbestos products sold by the defendants were defective. Defective-
ness, as this article discussed earlier, can be found if the products were
manufactured improperly, were designed improperly, or if, when
sold, they were not accompanied by adequate warnings. The plaintiff
typically will contend that the asbestos products were defective be-
cause they did not bear a warning that would have alerted him either
to the danger of working with those products, or to the need for tak-
ing precautions while working with them.
The plaintiff in this hypothetical also has been smoking ciga-
rettes for thirty-five years. He admits that he has read the warnings
on cigarette packages since 1966, and that he knows that cigarette
smoking is hazardous to his health, but nevertheless has continued to
smoke. At trial, evidence shows that the plaintiff is afflicted with hy-
pertension, a condition exacerbated by high sodium intake. Yet de-
spite his doctor's advice to avoid salt, the plaintiff admits to being a
heavy salt user. Given this evidence, the defendant can argue that
the suppliers' failure to warn was not the proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injuries. Even if there had been proper warnings, the defendant
can point out, the plaintiff would have disregarded them just as he
has disregarded the warnings on cigarette packages and those of his
doctor. This kind of argument is premised on the principle that in a
failure to warn case, a plaintiff must prove that had he been properly
alerted, he would have taken steps to avoid the product's potential
dangers. 13' If the jury finds that he would not have taken such steps,
the defendant will prevail.
131. See Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 429 F. Supp. 495 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (defendant manufacturer's warning of car's propensity to overturn if
swerved would not have been heeded anyway in situation where plaintiff was swerv-
ing to avoid imminent collision); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076, 1093 (5th Cir. 1973) ("the jury found that the unreasonably dangerous condi-
tion of the defendants' product was the proximate cause of Borel's injury. This neces-
sarily included a finding that, had adequate warnings been provided, Borel would
have chosen to avoid the danger."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Neal v. Carey
Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 370 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (trial testimony was
sufficient to show that communication of a warning by supplier to employees in an
asbestos insulation plant would have resulted in protective actions by both employees
and employer); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972) (defend-
ant manufacturers found not liable in suit by plaintiff who was injured when can of
freon exploded in his hand; since plaintiff admitted that he had not read the direc-
1262 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
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A variation on this "would-it-have-made-a-difference" defense
can be used in asbestos cases in which the plaintiff suffers from lung
cancer. If the plaintiff is a cigarette smoker, the defendant should
argue that the plaintiff, by his refusal to stop smoking, has to some
extent voluntarily proceeded to encounter the risk that he would de-
velop lung cancer. Defense counsel should also point out that the
alleged defect-the failure to warn-was not the proximate cause of
the lung cancer. Although the defense is not a sympathetic one, espe-
cially where a plaintiff is suffering from so catastrophic a disease as
cancer, it may be effective if presented properly.
Where a plaintiffs toxic tort claim does not arise in a products
liability context, his contention that he should have been warned and,
if warned, he would have acted differently, may not be so persuasive.
Another way of looking at a failure to warn claim is that it usually
arises in a situation where the plaintiff also alleges that the product
was defectively marketed. Where the toxic substance or product in-
volved was not marketed, as in the illegal dumping of a toxic sub-
stance in a local landfill, the legal duty to warn owed to the plaintiff
may be different than it would be in a products liability context. The
idea that an individual who illegally dumps toxic substances in a lo-
cal landfill has a legal duty to provide an adequate warning of the
hazards seems slightly absurd. Similarly absurd would be the re-
quirement that a plaintiff who is injured by such illegal dumping
prove that if warned, he would have attempted to avoid the danger-
meaning, perhaps, moving away from his home. Theories of liability
other than the failure to warn theory would clearly be more appropri-
ate under these circumstances.
tions on the can, the defendant's failure to warn could not have caused plaintiff's
injuries).
The inquiry regarding whether the plaintiff would have acted differently had he
known about a product's dangers is speculative in nature. Some courts have em-
ployed plaintiff-oriented tests for determining whether the properly alerted plaintiff
would have acted differently. The Fifth Circuit used the following method in Reyes v.
Wyeth Laboratories:
Where a consumer, whose injury the manufacturer should have reasonably
foreseen, is injured by a product sold without a required warning, a rebutta-
ble presumption will arise that the consumer would have read any warning
provided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize the risks. In the
absence of evidence rebutting the presumption, a jury finding that the de-
fendant's product was the producing cause of the plaintiffs injury would be
sufficient to hold him liable.
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974).
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D. Product Speciifcation Defense
Under the products liability law of most states, a manufacturer
or supplier has a non-delegable duty to provide a safe product. 32
Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions recognize an exception to this
general rule when a purchaser, with equal or superior knowledge
than the manufacturer, 133 provides the specifications for a given
product and requires that the manufacturer comply with those speci-
fications in making the product. 34 In those jurisdictions, a manufac-
turer's compliance with such specifications will insulate him from
liability to the ultimate user of the product 35 so long as the plans are
not so obviously dangerous that they should not reasonably be
followed. 136
Courts are divided over the applicability of this defense. Some
jurisdictions permit it in negligence actions, but refuse to permit it in
strict liability actions where there is a societal policy of imposing lia-
bility upon a manufacturer of a defective product despite the exercise
of all due care in the preparation and sale of that product. 37 In
132. See, e.g., Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893,
898 (1975) (manufacturer's duty to provide a non-defective product is non-delega-
ble); Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974)
(manufacturer is effectively the guarantor of his product's safety).
133. See Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (in finding defendant manufacturer not liable in strict liability, it was sig-
nificant that the manufacturer had less knowledge in the field than did the
purchaser).
134. See, e.g., Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973). InSpangler,
the Fourth Circuit held that a manufacturer who had built a crane according to a
customer's specifications could not be held liable for injuries sustained by that cus-
tomer's employee since the specifications had not called for a warning device that
indicated when the crane was in motion. Id. at 374. In rejecting the plaintiffs strict
liability claim, the court noted that "the products liability rule holding a manufac-
turer liable does not apply where the product has been manufactured in accordance
with the' plans and specifications of the purchaser except when such plans are so
obviously dangerous that they should not reasonably be followed." Id. at 375 (citing
Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 802 n.16 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aft'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967)).
See also Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa.
1980). In Ortin, a helicopter crashed due to the breaking of a component part that
had been weakened by "fatigue cracks." Id. at 174. The Orion court found that the
manufacturer had reasonably relied upon the specifications of a third party with
superior knowledge in producing that part, and therefore concluded that the manu-
facturer was not liable. Id. at 176.
135. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Independent Metal Prods. Co., 99 F.
Supp. 862, 868 (D. Neb. 1951) (where purchaser determined the design and specifica-
tion of a product and also the mode of manufacture, manufacturer could not be held
liable for failure to exercise reasonable care in adopting a formula that would make
the product safe for use), aft'd, 203 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1953).
136. See Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 802 n.16
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aj'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
137. See, e.g., Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165 (D. Kan. 1980). The
1264 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
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Pennsylvania there have been somewhat conflicting decisions regard-
ing the use of this defense-the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling
that the duty to provide a safe product is non-delegable, 38 and the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluding
that if a product is made to another's specifications, the party provid-
ing the specifications should be liable for a defect in those
specifications. 139
F. The Government Specifications Defense
The government specifications defense is a branch of the product
specification defense. This defense may become more relevant in fu-
ture toxic tort cases due to the government's increasing involvement
in public and private affairs. This defense is also important because
of its interaction with the government's traditional defense of sover-
eign immunity.140
The government specification or contract defense shields a man-
ufacturer or supplier from liability for any design defect in a product
built pursuant to a government contract and in strict compliance
with the specifications in that contract.14' This defense was tradition-
ally available to suppliers of equipment made pursuant to govern-
district court first acknowledged that under a negligence theory of recovery, "[i]t is
logical to absolve a manufacturer from liability for a negligently designed defective
product when the manufacturer is not the designer and plaintiffs theory of recovery
is negligence." Id. at 174. However, the Lenherr court then concluded that the Kan-
sas Supreme Court would hold a manufacturer liable under a theory of strict liability
because of the ultimate consumer's right to rely on a seller standing behind his prod-
uct and also due to the propriety of cost spreading. Id. at 174-75.
138. See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974).
In Salvador, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that "a manufacturer by market-
ing and advertising his product impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use.
We have decided that no current societal interest is served by permitting the manu-
facturer to place a defective article in the stream of commerce and then to avoid
responsibility for damages caused by the defect." Id. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907.
139. See Orion Ins. Co., Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173,
175 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (if design defect is present, it arose from party providing the
specifications placing the part in the helicopter, not from the manufacturer following
the specification).
140. See Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn.
1965). In Dolphin Gardens, the district court held that the United States was immune
from tort liability for consequences of acts in performance of discretionary functions.
Id. at 826. The court further found that the private contractor doing government
contract work was entitled to share this immunity. Id. at 827. See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1976) ("discretionary function" exception to liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Act).
141. See Rivkin & Silberfeld, Compliance with Product Speqfications: Shield or
Sword?, 17 FORUM 1012, 1017-25 (1981-82) (discussion of the government specifica-
tion defense). See generally Note, Liability of a Manufacturer for Products Defectively
Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1025 (1982).
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ment specifications, 42 but in light of the expanding application and
development of strict liability, the continuing viability of this defense
has been subject to serious question. Recently, however, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, in In Re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litz'gation, 143 specifically permitted the
use of this defense. The court, in upholding this defense in Agent Or-
ange I, acknowledged that considerations of fairness and public policy
underlie this defense. 144 First, the court noted that tort principles tra-
ditionally attempt to impose liability on the wrongdoer, "not on the
otherwise innocent contractor whose only role in causing the injury
was the proper performance of a plan supplied by the govern-
ment."'' 45 Second, the court observed that imposing liability on the
contractor would force increases in contract prices to cover the manu-
142. See, e.g., Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321
(1924). In Ryan, the manufacturer defendant constructed a building and canopy in
compliance with United States government specifications. Id. at 44, 145 N.E. at 321.
Because the specifications provided for improper support, the canopy collapsed
shortly after construction, killing the plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 47, 145 N.E. at 322.
In affirming a judgment in favor of the manufacturer, the Court of Appeals of New
York stated the general rule regarding the government specification defense:
There was nothing to show that the plans and specifications were so obvi-
ously defective that a contractor of average skill and ordinary prudence
would not have attempted the construction according to plans. This is the
rule to be applied. A builder or contractor is justified in relying upon the
plans and specifications which he has contracted to follow unless they are so
apparently defective that an ordinary builder of ordinary prudence would
be put upon notice that the work was dangerous and likely to cause injury.
Such was not the case here.
Id. at 46, 145 S.E. at 321-22. See also Yearsley v. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21
(1940) ("if [the] authority to carry out the project was validly conferred . . . there is
no liability on the part of the contractor for executing [the government's] will"); My-
ers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1963) ("to the extent that the work
performed by [the contractor] was done under its contract with the [government],
and in conformity with the terms of said contract, no liability can be imposed upon it
for any damages claimed to have been suffered by [plaintiffs]"); Valley Forge Gar-
dens, Inc. v. James D. Morrissey, Inc., 385 Pa. 477, 480, 123 A.2d 888, 891 (1956) ("if
the contractor, in privity with the State or its instrumentality, performs the contract
work which the State is privileged to have done, the privilege operates to relieve the
contractor from liability to third persons except for negligence or willful tort in per-
formance of work").
143. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) [hereinafter referred to as Agent Orange 1],
reh'g dented, 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as Agent Orange
II]. In both Agent Orange cases, Vietnam war veterans and members of their families
sued the United States Government and various chemical manufacturers for damage
suffered as a result of the veterans' exposure to herbicides in Vietnam. 506 F. Supp.
at 768. Defendant manufacturers asserted, inter aha, that the government contract
defense precluded liability. Id. at 792.
144. 506 F. Supp. at 793.
145. Id. According to the court in Agent Orange!, "The imposition of tort liabil-
ity on a wrongdoer can have a strong prophylactic effect; tortfeasors held liable for
damages that flow from their wrongdoing have a strong incentive to prevent the
occurrence of future harm." Id.
1266 [Vol. 28: p. 1208
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facturer's increased risk of loss and that the increased cost would have
an adverse effect on the public's tax burden. 146
After sustaining the legal sufficiency of the government specifica-
tion defense, Judge Pratt in Agent Orange Jf147 set forth the elements of
the defense: A defendant manufacturer must prove 1) that the gov-
ernment established specifications for the alleged defective product;
2) that the product manufactured by the defendant met the govern-
ment specifications in all material respects; and 3) that the govern-
ment knew as much or more than the defendant did about the
hazards associated with the product. 148
Since Agent Orange II, several other courts, including courts in
Pennsylvania, have given firm support to the use of the government
specification defense. 149
It should be noted, however, that the government specification
defense is only applicable in cases where a plaintiff alleges that the
product has a design defect or that the manufacturer failed to warn of
the product's hazards. In cases where the plaintiff contends that the
product in question failed to comply with the government's specifica-
146. Id. at 794. The court also noted that such considerations take on increased
significance during war time. Id.
147. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), denying reh'g to, 506 F. Supp. 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
148. Id. at 1055.
149. See, e.g., Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982)
(upholding government specification defense in a strict liability action). In Brown,
the Third Circuit rejected plaintiffs' contention that the government specification
defense should not be available to a defenuant manufacturer unless it can show it
had no discretion in the design of a product supplied by the government and was
compelled to build it in the manner specified by the government. Id. at 253-54.
The plaintiff in Brown had also contended that this defense was not available if
the manufacturer "had been able to suggest modifications, in or additions to, the
bulldozer's design at anytime before final delivery." Id. Applying Pennsylvania law,
the Third Circuit concluded that a defendant manufacturer must establish that it
strictly complied with government specifications, but stressed that it was not neces-
sary for the defendant to prove that it was under a compulsion to manufacture the
product according to the government's specifications. Id. at 254.
The Third Circuit, however, did note that
[ilf we were writing on a clean slate, or were ourselves fashioning the law of
Pennsyvania, we might be persuaded that a contractor must prove some
degree of compulsion in order to successfully raise the government contrac-
tor defense. We are, however, constrained by existing Pennsylvania law,
and it would be inappropriate at this juncture for us to include a compul-
sion element on such a speculative basis.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See also McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980) (uphold-
ing government specification defense in strict liability and negligence actions); San-
ner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1 (Law Div. 1976) (no liability imposed on
governmental contractor who strictly complies with U.S. Army plans and specifica-
tions), aft'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J.
616 (1978).
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tions, the government specification defense would be unavailable to a
defendant. The government specifications defense may have great
utility in future toxic tort cases provided that all of the necessary ele-
ments of this defense, as outlined in Agent Orange II, are met.
V. THE LAST RESORT DEFENSES
A. The Sophisticated Purchaser as Superseding Intervening Cause
Section 440 of the Second Restatement of Torts defines a super-
seding cause as "an act of a third person or other force which by its
intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another
which has antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing
about. ' 150 An "intervening" cause does not relieve the defendant
from liability for his negligence; however, a "superseding" cause
does.' 51 Section 442 of the Restatement sets forth some of the consid-
erations for determining whether a given contributing force is a "su-
perseding" cause. Among these are the following: 1) whether the
harm that resulted would have been different had defendant's negli-
gence been the sole cause; 2) whether the intervening force was an
independent force or was the direct result of defendant's negligence;
and 3) the degree of culpability of the party's act which sets the inter-
vening force in motion.1 52
Defendants who manufactured the product which allegedly
caused the plaintiff's injury will often use the defense of superseding
cause in cases where the most negligent party may have been the
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965).
151. See W. PROSSER, supra note 86, § 44, at 270-71.
152. Section 442 of the Second Restatement provides certain considerations that
the reporters believed were important in determining whether an intervening force is
a superseding cause of harm to another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind
from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear af-
ter the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circum-
stances existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of
any situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is
not a normal result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a
third person's act or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third per-
son which is wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third per-
son to liability to him;
(0 the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which
sets the intervening force in motion.
Id. § 442.
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plaintiff's employer. 153 Under the workmen's compensation statutes
of most states, a suit by a plaintiff against his employer is barred as a
matter of law.' 54 Consequently, in order to recover for a job-related
injury, a plaintiff must sue some party other than his employer; in
toxic tort cases, this would usually be the manufacturer or supplier.
A defendant in such a lawsuit should attempt to escape liability by
arguing that the conduct of the employer was a superseding cause of
any injury suffered by the plaintiff.
The superseding/intervening cause defense is difficult to apply
because under present tort law a plaintiff can establish causation
merely by showing that either the conduct of the defendant or the
defect in the defendant's product was a substantial contributing fac-
tor to his injuries. There can be many causes for a single injury.
Whether one cause is substantial when compared to another may de-
pend on whose head is on the chopping block, or on the direction in
which plaintiffs expert is pointed. Obviously the defendant who is a
153. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Re-
lated Asbestos Cases was a strict liability action brought by insulators and shipyard
workers who had been employed by the United States Navy over varying periods of
time. Id. at 1150. The defendants, manufacturers of asbestos products supplied to
the Navy shipyard, asserted as an affirmative defense that the Navy as employer was
negligent in failing to provide plaintiffs with a safe work place, and that this negli-
gence constituted a superseding cause. Id. The plaintiffs argued that this defense
should not be allowed in strict liability, but the court differed stating, "We are un-
able to agree. Strict liability never has been, and is not now, absolute liability. The
plaintiff in a strict liability case must still prove that a defect in the design or manu-
facture of a product was a proximate cause of injury." Id. (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
154. Workmen's compensation statutcs frequently include an "exclusivity"
clause. Such a clause states that if an employee's disease or injury is covered by the
statute, the exclusive remedy against the employer is a workmen's compensation
award. 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 65.00 (1983).
Exclusivity clauses have served to preclude an asbestos-injured employee from
suing his employer in tort in a number of cases. See, e.g., Weldon v. Celotex Corp.,
695 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1982); Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., 406 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind.
App. 1980); Davis v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 338 A.2d 146 (Me. 1975). Some states,
however, recognize exceptions to this bar, the first of which allows an injured worker
to sue when he alleges that his employer intentionally caused his injury. See, e.g.,
Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 390 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (deliber-
ate failure of employer to warn of asbestos hazards allows plaintiff to sue in inten-
tional tort); In re Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (N.D. Ill.
1981) ("plaintiff's allegations of intentional torts should not be relegated to the statu-
tory remedy").
The other exception, called the "dual capacity doctrine," allows the employee to
sue his employer in tort when the employer is also the manufacturer of the product
that caused the injury. Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigatzon, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871,
879 (1983). The rationale behind the doctrine is that the employer/manufacturer
should not be able to escape liability merely because he is an employer under the
workmen's compensation statutes. Id. Plaintiffs invoking this doctrine have gener-
ally been unsuccessful. Id.
1982-1983] 1269
62
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 6 [1983], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss6/7
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
party of record will have the accusing finger pointed toward him. His
position, then, will not be altogether sympathetic to a jury if his only
defense is to attempt to redirect that finger to one who is not a party
to the lawsuit.
Because the superseding cause defense is most frequently used in
cases in which the plaintiffs employer is allegedly the most culpable
party, a specialized form of that defense has evolved known as the
"sophisticated purchaser defense." This defense is appropriate in in-
stances where the purchaser of a product possesses a level of expertise
equal or superior to that of the product's supplier. In such a case, the
defendant will argue that by virtue of the purchaser's superior
knowledge of the hazards presented by the product, the supplier's
duty to warn of these hazards is preempted. 155
In Hopkins v. E I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1 5 6 for example, the
Third Circuit held that a dynamite manufacturer was not liable for
failing to warn of the danger of premature explosion since the plain-
tiff's supervisor was fully aware of this danger. The court found that
the duty to warn was solely that of the supervisor. 157 Similarly, in
155. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The
defendants in RelatedAsbestos Cases, manufacturers of asbestos products supplied to a
naval shipyard, asserted the sophisticated purchaser defense in a strict liability action
brought against them by various shipyard workers. Id. at 1151. They argued that
the Navy, as an employer, was aware of the dangers of asbestos but nonetheless mis-
used the products, thereby absolving the manufacturer for failure to warn. Id. The
court allowed this defense. Id See also Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co., 532 F.2d 501, 503-04 (5th Cir. 1976) (in a strict liability action to recover
for property damage, an oil and gas company was deemed to be a sophisticated pur-
chaser of tubing to be used in exploratory oil and gas drilling; a manufacturer is not
"compelled to warn sophisticated purchasers of dangers of which the buyer either
knows or should be aware"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977).
Cf. Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), affd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). Littlehale was a products liability action
brought in strict liability by employees who were injured aboard a ship while con-
ducting blasting operations. Id. at 793. The plaintiffs in this case sued the manufac-
turer of the blasting caps that had been used in these operations, asserting a failure to
warn. Id. The district court applied a "sophisticated user" rationale and found for
the defendants. Id. at 803. According to this court, "the user was as well or more
fully informed of the hazards involved and the correct methods of use as was the
manufacturer." Id.
156. 212 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954). In Hopkins, the plaintiff's decedent was a
workman who had been killed by a dynamite explosion which occurred as a result of
his placing a stick of dynamite into a hole that was still hot from drilling. Id. at 624.
Evidence was presented to show that the blasting foreman who supervised the dece-
dent's operations was fully aware that dynamite had the propensity to explode if it
were placed into a newly drilled hole. Id. at 625-26. The court concluded that the
manufacturer could not be held liable in a failure to warn negligence action for an
accident that resulted from the employer's disregard of a known hazard. Id. at 626.
157. See id. at 626.
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Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel &Iron Corp.,158 the Ninth Circuit held that the
knowledge of supervisory personnel regarding the dangers inherent in
using a particular metal strand during a concrete stressing process
obviated the duty of the manufacturer to warn of particular
hazards.159 In both of these cases, the courts recognized that where a
plaintiff is being directly controlled and supervised by personnel who
possess technical knowledge and expertise with respect to the product,
a warning by the product manufacturer is neither necessary nor re-
quired. As the court inJacobson reasoned, "[T]here is no duty on a
supplier of chattels to foresee that the [employer] will fail to follow
warnings given or to employ knowledge possessed."'160
Generally, the sophisticated purchaser defense has been avail-
able in negligence actions. Section 388 of the Second Restatement of
Torts, for example, states that if a supplier of goods has reason to
expect that the ultimate user will discover the danger inhering in a
product, his duty to warn is abrogated.' 6 1 Courts have also tradition-
ally held that the degree of knowledge possessed by one to whom the
chattel is supplied is a pertinent consideration in determining
whether a supplier may reasonably rely on an individual to warn.' 62
The availability of the sophisticated purchaser defense in strict
158. 409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1979). Jacobson was a wrongful death action in
strict tort liability and warranty brought against a steel strand manufacturer. Id. at
1266-67. On the day of the accident, a steel strand used to prestress roof beams
snapped, causing the death of the plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 1265. TheJacobson
court held that the defendant could not be held strictly liable in tort for failure to
warn of the potential dangers of snapping since the decedent's employer "had full
knowledge" that the use to which these strands were being put "was extremely haz-
ardous and potentially harmful." Id. at 1271.
159. Id. at 1273. TheJacobson court explained that
[wihere a supplier furnishes chattels, the use of which is to be directed by
technicians or engineers, it is sufficient to insulate the supplier from liability
for failure to warn if the warnings given are sufficient to apprise the engi-
neers or technicians of the dangers involved. . . . There is no duty to warn
those who simply follow the directions of the engineers or technicians.
Id.
160. Id.
161. For the full text of § 388, see note 100 supra.
162. See, e.g., Croteau v. Bordon Co., 277 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (in a
negligence action for failure to warn, a chemical manufacturer's liability is relieved
where a laboratory technician working under the supervision of a knowledgeable
chemist is injured in an explosion). See also West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co.,
197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1972). West was a products liability action brought under a
negligence theory by an iron worker against the manufacturer of a wire rope sling.
Id. at 208. The plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries he sustained when the
sling, carrying a heavy load of equipment, parted and struck the plaintiff in the head.
Id. at 206. The plaintiff contended that the manufacturer had breached his duty to
warn of the sling's maximum capacity. Id. at 208. The court held that it was a
question for the jury as to whether the plaintiff's expertise as an ironworker relieved
the manufacturer of its duty to warn. Id. at 211.
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liability actions is not as certain. In Lockett v. General Electric Co., 1 6 3
the trial court accepted this defense in a strict liability case where the
plaintiff had been injured by a ship's engine gears which the defend-
ant had supplied to the plaintiff's employer, a corporation engaged in
ship construction. The Lockett court stated that there is "no duty to
give a warning to members of a profession against dangers generally
known in that profession."'' 64 Other courts, however, have disallowed
this defense in strict liability actions. These courts reason that in
strict liability the manufacturer's duty to provide the ultimate con-
sumer a safe product is nondelegable.165 Similarly, in a strict liability
action where the alleged defect is a failure to warn, the manufac-
turer's duty to warn is also considered by these courts to be nondele-
gable. Thus, in making a determination of the manufacturer's
liability, courts adopting the nondelegable duty position view as irrel-
evant the fact that a plaintiffs employer may have independently
known of the particular dangers associated with the manufacturer's
product. These courts also claim that they have rejected the sophisti-
cated purchaser defense because it focuses the jury's attention on the
defendant's conduct rather than on the defendant's product, thereby
163. 376 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975).
164. Id. at 1212. The Locketu court reasoned that "even assuming for the sake of
argument that the condition was not readily observable to a person without special
experience, it certainly can be assumed that Sun Ship has special experience in the
assembly and construction of vessels ...[which should have made it] able to per-
ceive that danger." Id. Thus, the court concluded, the manufacturer "had a legiti-
mate right to rely on Sun Ship to protect its own employees from harm and had no
duty to anticipate that Sun Ship would operate the gears so as to present a dangerous
condition." Id.
165. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa.
1982). In Neal, 24 former employees of a plant which manufactured asbestos insula-
tion products brought suit against the companies which had supplied asbestos to the
plant. Id. at 365. The plaintiffs contended that the supplier's failure to warn of the
hazards of asbestos was the proximate cause of their asbestos-related injuries. Id.
The defendant in Neal, however, claimed that the acts or omissions of the plaintiffs'
employer in failing to warn and protect employees against asbestos exposure was a
superseding cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. Id.
In its decision in Neal, the district court found the employer's conduct to be a
causal factor in the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. Id. at 371. However, the court
said that this did not automatically mean that such conduct was a superseding cause.
Id. Since the employer's conduct was similar to that of the entire industry, the court
concluded that it could not be deemed so extraordinary as to constitute a superseding
cause. Id. at 371-72. According to the Neal court, the supplier's duty to warn was
"non-delegable," and therefore the supplier was still liable to the plaintiffs despite the
intervening acts of the plaintiffs' employer. Id. at 369. For an additional discussion
of Neal, see notes 63, 131 & 154 supra.
See also Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1976) (in
strict liability action for failure to warn of fatal properties of a chemical solvent, the
manufacturer cannot escape liability by establishing the employer's independent
knowledge of these properties).
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converting a strict liability action into a negligence action.1 66
Even in jurisdictions accepting the defenses philosophically, the
availability of those defenses is limited by those sections of the Re-
statement that control its applicability in actions brought under a
negligence theory. Section 447 of the Restatement provides that the
negligent act of an intervenor is not a superseding cause if the follow-
ing factors exist: 1) the original actor should have foreseen the possi-
bility of the intervenor's conduct; 2) a reasonable, informed person
would not regard the intervenor's act as highly extraordinary; or
3) the intervenor's act was not extraordinarily negligent and was a
normal consequence of the situation created by the original actor. 167
Section 447's limiting effect on the superseding/intervening cause and
sophisticated purchaser defenses can be seen in the typical asbestos
case.
Generally, in an asbestos-related disease suit, the defendant con-
tends that the plaintiff's employer breached his duty of providing a
safe workplace to plaintiff and, as a result of this breach, the em-
ployer's conduct became a superseding cause of the plaintiff's injury.
However, a "superseding cause" defense will probably be rejected on
the basis of section 447 if the plaintiff can prove that it was foresee-
able that the employers would not have advised their employees of
the hazards of asbestos or of the need to take safety precautions, or
that the employer's failure to warn or take precautions was not ex-
traordinarily negligent, and that injury resulted from the defendant
supplier's action. 168
Another Restatement section further limits the use of the super-
seding cause as a defense in asbestos cases brought under a negligence
theory. In order to establish that a third party's actions or inactions
amounted to a superseding cause, section 442B requires that the in-
tervenor (the employer) intentionally caused the harm, and that this
harm was different from the harm caused by the original act.169 Un-
less both of these elements are established, the original actor remains
166. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 368-69
(E.D. Pa. 1982).
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965).
168. Id.
169. Id. § 442B. According to § 442B of the Restatement,
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a
particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact
that the harm is brought about through the intervention of another force
does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally
caused by a third person and is not within the scope of the risk created by
the actor's conduct.
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liable. 170
To demonstrate the limiting effect of section 442B, another ex-
ample from asbestos litigation may be helpful. As previously noted,
plaintiffs often allege that the supplier was negligent or that the prod-
uct was defective because the manufacturer failed to warn. In the
typical asbestos case, the plaintiff will counter defendants' invocation
of the superseding cause defense by contending that in order for the
defense to be available under section 442B of the Restatement, the
defendant must prove that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was
outside the scope of risk created by the manufacturer's failure to
warn. 1 7' In most cases, a court will be likely to conclude that the
harm to the plaintiff resulted from the asbestos supplier's original fail-
ure to warn and was thus within the scope of risk. Consequently, an
asbestos defendant when confronted with a jury instruction based
upon sections 447 or 442B of the Restatement would be hard pressed
to utilize successfully either the superseding/intervening cause or so-
phisticated purchaser defenses. Similarly, it is doubtful that defend-
ants in other toxic tort situations would be able to use these defenses
due to the courts' tendency to find that a manufacturer or supplier
had a duty to warn under sections 447 and 442B of the Restatement.
Another problem inherent in the superseding/intervening cause
defense is the issue of when a product supplier's duty to warn is dis-
charged. Frequently a supplier may have warned an intermediary,
such as the plaintiff's employer, of the hazards associated with using
the manufacturer's product. These warnings for various reasons,
however, may never have reached the ultimate consumer of the prod-
uct. In some instances, courts confronted with such a factual scenario
have held that the manufacturer of a product has a nondelegable
duty to provide the ultimate user of a product with sufficient warn-
ings and instructions to enable him to use the product safely. 172
Courts subscribing to this nondelegable duty theory have not, how-
ever, held manufacturers and suppliers who have provided adequate
warnings and instructions for their products liable for breakdowns in
170. See id.
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B (1965). For the full text of
§ 442B, see note 169 supra.
172. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The Bord court stated that "a seller may be
liable to the ultimate consumer or user for failure to give adequate warnings. The
seller's warning must be reasonably calculated to reach such persons and the presence
of an intermediate party will not by itself relieve the seller of this duty." Id. at 1091
(emphasis in original). For a more detailed discussion of the duty to warn, see notes
99, 106-08 and accompanying text supra.
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the communication process that have been caused by others. 7 3
Even in situations where a defendant has equipped his product
with sufficient warnings and instructions, the plaintiff can nonetheless
attack either the means which the defendant used to warn the prod-
uct's user or the language used in the warning. 1 74 Courts rarely, if
ever, rule that a defendant's warning is adequate as a matter of law,
leaving the question instead for the jury. However, a manufacturer
whose product is accompanied by sufficient warnings and by instruc-
tions on how to use the product safely might be more successful utiliz-
ing a "proximate cause" or a "defective product" defense, rather than
173. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
In Borel, the Fifth Circuit stated that
[i]n general, of course, a manufacturer is not liable for miscarriages in the
communication process that are not attributable to his failure to warn or
the adequacy of the warning. This may occur, for example, where some
intermediate party is notified of the danger, or discovers it for himself, and
proceeds deliberately to ignore it and to pass on the product without a
warning.
Id. at 1091-92. See also Weekes v. Michigan Chrome & Chem. Co., 352 F.2d 603, 607
(6th Cir. 1965) (supplier not required to go so far as to insure that each ultimate
consumer was adequately warned of his product's dangerous propensities since it
would be an impossible burden).
But cf. Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Co., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1976). The
Third Circuit in Dougherty found that the question of whether the supplier was re-
quired to warn the ultimate purchaser varied under the circumstances. The court
explained that
[t]he determination of whether the method or means utilized to warn is
sufficient will depend upon a balancing of considerations involving among
other factors, the dangerous nature of the product, the form in which the
product is used, the intensity and form of the warnings given, the burdens
to be imposed by requiring warnings, and the likelihood that the particular
warning will be adequately communicated to those who will forseeably use
the product.
Id.
174. See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962). In Spruill, a
child died as a result of drinking furniture polish left within his reach by his mother.
Id. at 81-82. The product manufacturer claimed that the inadequacies of the warn-
ing were irrelevant because the mother admitted that she never read the label. Id. at
86-87. The Fourth Circuit, however, disagreed with the manufacturer and stated,
In this case had the warning been in a form calculated to attract the user's
attention, due to its position, size, and coloring of its lettering, and had the
words used therein been reasonably calculated to convey a conception of
the true nature of the danger, this mother might not have left the product
in the presence of her child.
Id. at 87. For further discussion of Spruill, see note 108 supra and note 175 iqfra.
See also Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 258 Pa. Super. 59, 391 A.2d 1074 (1978)
(plaintiff contended that manufacturer's use of only the word "Danger" on a drum of
combustible chemicals was an inadequate warning which made the product defec-
tive); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945) (plaintiff con-
tended that the words "Caution! Do not inhale fumes. Use only in a well ventilated
place. . . " on a container of poisonous cleaning solvent was an insufficient warn-
ing). For additional discussion regarding inadequate manufacturer's warnings, see
note 116 supra.
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the sophisticated purchaser defense. Under the "proximate cause"
defense, a defendant would contend that any failure in the communi-
cation process was caused by another party and thus he could not be
held responsible for it. Under the defective product argument, a de-
fendant would claim the product was not defective when it left his
control because it was accompanied by sufficient warnings and in-
structions to make the product safe for its intended use. 175 Either the
''proximate cause" or "defective product" argument would be more
affirmative than the "superseding cause" or "sophisticated purchaser"
argument and, therefore, more appealing to the factfinder.
B. Contributory Negligence
The doctrine of contributory negligence bars a plaintiff from re-
covering any damages for the injuries he suffered if he contributed in
any way to those injuries through his own negligence. 176 A majority
ofjurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, have abrogated the contribu-
tory negligence defense in favor of a comparative negligence stan-
dard. 177 Comparative negligence, rather than completely barring a
recovery by a plaintiff whose negligence contributed to his injuries,
generally reduces a plaintiff's recovery by the percentage that his neg-
ligence contributed to the accident or event. 178 Thus, where a plain-
tiff has been injured and the jury decides that the defendant is eighty
175. See, e.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (after
an infant's death through the ingestion of furniture polish, manufacturer of product
alleged that product contained sufficient warnings and that the mother's negligence
was the sole proximate cause of the child's death). For a further discussion of Sprui1,
see notes 108 & 174 supra.
176. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 86, § 65 (1971).
177. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982). The Penn-
sylvania statute provides as follows:
In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death
or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or
his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the
causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages sustained by plaintiff shall be diminished in pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
Id See also Costa v. Lair, 241 Pa. Super. 517, 520-21, 363 A.2d 1313, 1314-15 (1976)
(comparison of contributory and comparative negligence theories in Pennsylvania);
W. PROSSER, supra note 86, § 67.
Only 10 jurisdictions have retained the contributory negligence defense: Ala-
bama, Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Mis-
souri, North Carolina, and Virginia. C. HEFr & C. HErT, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE MANUAL 188-89 (Supp. 1983). For a list of states that have adopted
some form of comparative negligence, see notes 179 & 181 bthfa.
178. See, e.g., Anderson v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 423 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir.
1970) (under Mississippi law, contributory negligence is no bar to recovery; instead
damages are reduced proportionally).
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percent responsible for the accident and the plaintiff is twenty per-
cent at fault, any award in favor of the plaintiff would be reduced by
twenty percent.
In "pure" comparative negligence states, 7 9 if the plaintiff were
eighty percent at fault for the injuries that he suffered and the defend-
ant was twenty percent at fault, any award in favor of the plaintiff
would be reduced by eighty percent but the plaintiff would still re-
cover twenty percent of his damages.1 80 In "non-pure" comparative
negligence states,1 8 ' such as Pennsylvania, the plaintiff is barred from
recovery if his negligence was more than fifty percent responsible for
the injury causing event.' 82
Contributory negligence in most jurisdictions is not a defense to
a strict liability action.'8 3 Several courts have fiercely debated the
applicability of comparative negligence principles to strict liability
actions.' 8 4 Jurisdictions that do not permit the contributory or com-
179. The following states have adopted "pure" comparative negligence: Alaska
(Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Ala. 1975)); California (Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)); Florida (Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)); Illinois (Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886
(1981)); Iowa (Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982)); Louisiana (LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1979)); Michigan (Placek v. City of Sterling
Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979)); Mississippi (MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 11-7-15 (1972)); New Mexico (Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981));
New York (N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 1411-1413 (McKinney 1975)); Rhode Island
(R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1983); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010
(1973) (repealed by) Laws 1981 ch. 27 § 17 (Supp. 1983)).
180. See C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 150
(1978).
181. The states other than Pennsylvania that have adopted a "non pure" com-
parative negligence are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Da-
kota, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. C.
HEFT & C. HEFT, supra note 180, at 188-89.
182. See C. HEFT & C. HEFT, supra note 180, § 1.40. Some non-pure negligence
states permit a plaintiff to recover only if his negligence is less than that of the de-
fendants. Id.
183. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 1979) (ac-
knowledging that "contributory negligence generally has not been recognized as a
defense to a section 402A action"); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83,
100, 337 A.2d 893, 901 (1975) (in Pennsylvania a "plaintiff cannot be precluded from
recovery in a strict liability case because of his own negligence"); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) ("[c]ontributory negligence of the
plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover
the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence").
184. Several courts have been willing to apply comparative principles to a strict
liability action. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555
P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). Other courts have declined to apply comparative negli-
gence principles in strict liability actions on the ground that such an application
would be fundamentally incompatible with the nature of a strict liability action. See,
70
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 6 [1983], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss6/7
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
parative negligence defenses in strict liability actions stress that in this
type of action the jury's focus should be on the alleged defective prod-
uct and not on the conduct of either the plaintiff or the defendant.185
Under the principles of strict liability, these jurisdictions argue, if the
defendant supplied a defective product which was the proximate
cause of plaintiffs injuries, he should be fully liable for any injuries
suffered by the plaintiff unless the plaintiff's conduct was so reckless
as to constitute product misuse. 18 6
Whether courts will generally continue to exclude the contribu-
tory and comparative negligence defenses in a strict liability action
remains to be seen as a significant number of progressive jurisdictions
have ruled that it is proper in strict liability cases for a jury to deter-
mine the relative degree of causal fault for the accident attributable
to the plaintiff and to reduce the plaintiffs recovery accordingly.' 18 7
While the contributory negligence defense has often been effec-
tive in personal injury cases, contributory negligence evidence in a
toxic tort case generally has not enabled a defendant to escape liabil-
ity completely. If a toxic substance injures enough people so that a
cause of action arising from it would be construed as a toxic tort, it is
doubtful that a jury would be inclined to believe that the plaintiff
brought his injuries upon himself through his own carelessness. Ulti-
mately, if the contributory negligence defense is to have a real value
e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Nebraska law);
Kinard v. The Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1977).
185. See, e.g., Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th
Cir. 1974). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit injackson stated as follows:
In strict liability it is of no moment what defendant 'had reason to believe.'
Liability arises from 'sell[ing] any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer.' It is the unreasonableness of
the condition of the product, not the conduct of the defendant, that creates
liability.
Id.
186. See Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (possibility
that a plaintiff may be barred from recovery because of his own misconduct has been
significantly narrowed to those cases in which voluntary assumption of risk or prod-
uct misuse occurs); Decorative Precast Stone Erectors, Inc. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 493
F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (in Pennsylvania, under § 402A, misuse of a product
can absolve a manufacturer from liability), affd sub nom. Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the product
misuse defense, see notes 194-196 and accompanying text infra.
187. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (pure
comparative negligence applicable to strict liability action under Virgin Island law);
Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (comparative negli-
gence applied to strict liability action despite facial limitation of the statute to negli-
gence actions); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598
(D. Idaho 1976) (non-pure comparative negligence standard applied to strict liability
action under Idaho law).
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in a toxic tort context, it will probably be in the area of apportion-
ment of damages only.
C. Assumption of the Risk
Where a party has subjective, personal knowledge of the risks
associated with a particular product or substance, and nevertheless
proceeds to work with that product in such a fashion as to encounter
the hazard, courts have generally denied the plaintiff recovery on the
ground that he has assumed the risk.188 Assumption of the risk has
long been held to be a valid defense in both negligence and strict
liability actions. 189 Successful application of this defense consists of
three elements: 1) the plaintiff's knowledge that a condition is dan-
gerous; 2) the plaintiff's appreciation of the nature or extent of the
danger; and 3) the plaintiffs voluntary exposure to the danger. 90
The assumption of the risk defense is an affirmative defense, so the
defendant has the burden of proving its existence and applicabil-
188. See W. PROSSER, supra note 86, § 68.
189. See, e.g., Vargus v. Pitman Mfg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 116, 121 (E.D. Pa.)
("there is at this time no reason to believe that Pennsylvania intended to eliminate
. . . [assumption of the risk] as a defense to a claim of strict products liability with
the adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act), affd sub nom. Pitman Mfg. Co. v.
Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 673 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir. 1981); Clarke v. Brockway Motor
Trucks, 372 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (assumption of risk is a valid defense
to a claim based on strict liability); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83,
100, 337 A.2d 893, 901 (1975) (a plaintiff can be precluded from recovery only if he
knows of the specific defect eventually causing his injury and voluntarily proceeds to
use the product with knowledge of the danger caused by the defect).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496 (1965). Section 496A of the
Restatement states the general principle underlying the doctrine of assumption of
risk: "A plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent
or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm." Id. § 496A.
Section 496C of the Restatement explains in more detail the requirements for this
defense:
[A] plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself or his things
caused by defendant's conduct or by the condition of defendant's land or
chattels, and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses to enter or remain, or to
permit his things to enter or to remain within the area of that risk, under
circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it, is not entitled to
recover for harm within that risk.
Id. § 496C. Section 496D then emphasizes that a plaintiff does not assume the risk
"unless he then knows of the existence of the risk and appreciates its unreasonable
character." Id. § 496D.
See Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa.
1976). In Thomas, a physician brought an action against the manufacturer of a surgi-
cal instrument to recover damages for electrical burn of the cornea of his eye which
was allegedly caused by a design defect in the manufacturer's product. Id. at 258.
Defendant countered that the plaintiff had operated the instrument when he knew
that it was not operating properly. Id. at 262. In its opinion the district court noted
that the focus of the defense was on "the subjective facts of what Dr. Thomas actually
knew, understood and appreciated." Id. at 263. The court concluded that the
awareness that something was wrong with the instrument fell "far short of a subjec-
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ity. 191 Since this defense requires the defendant to establish that the
plaintiff had the necessary subjective knowledge, even the most artful
cross-examiner will find it difficult to meet this burden of proof. In a
toxic tort case, the long latency periods often associated with diseases
related to exposure to a toxic substance further curtail the usefulness
of this defense. With diseases characterized by long latency periods, a
defendant often does not have access to sources of proof dating back
to a worker's first exposure to a toxic substance. Thus, a defendant
has no way to counter the claims of a worker who maintains that he
was unaware of the risks associated with the toxic substance when he
was first exposed to it, and therefore either was not in a position to
avoid exposure or by that time, had already suffered sufficient expo-
sure to have caused the injuries that he alleges.
Another complicating factor in a defendant's use of the assump-
tion of the risk defense in toxic tort cases is that a defendant claiming
that the plaintiff assumed the risk, but that the product was not de-
fective, is maintaining factually inconsistent theories. If a product is
not defective, then the manufacturer or supplier cannot be held liable
in a toxic tort case and the issue of assumption of the risk does not
arise. In toxic tort cases where the plaintiff's theory is the defendant's
failure to warn, it will, as a practical matter, be difficult for a defend-
ant, who has failed to warn of the health hazards associated with his
product, to convince the jury that the plaintiff, nevertheless, knew of
the alleged hazard and chose to encounter it.
This defense is fraught with other problems as well. For in-
stance, a supplier's defense in a toxic tort case is usually that he was
unaware of the specific hazards associated with the toxic substance
when it was sold. In such a context, it is difficult to allege that the
plaintiff-who in almost all cases knows less about a given product
than the defendant-knew of the product's specific hazards when he
purchased it. Furthermore, in cases where the defendant has pro-
vided sufficient warning of the health hazards associated with his
tive perception and appreciation of the particular risk of harm that ultimately re-
sulted, which is required to invoke assumption of the risk". Id.
See also Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 483 Pa. 75, 88, 394 A.2d 546,
552-53 (1978) ("[a]ssumption of the risk as a defense requires a demonstration that, in
fact, plaintiff knew of the danger created by defendant's negligence and explicitly or
implicitly accepted the risks created by this negligence"). But see Green v. Parisi, 478
F.2d 313, 315 (3d Cir. 1973) (since subjective awareness element of assumption of risk
is exceedingly difficult to prove, it may be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances).
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496G (1965). Section 496G of the
Restatement provides that "[i]f the defendant would otherwise be subject to liability
to the plaintiff, the burden of proof of the plaintiff's assumption of risk is upon the
defendant." See also Green v. Parisi, 478 F.2d 313, 315 (3d Cir. 1973).
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product, the defendant should not argue that the plaintiff had as-
sumed the risk of injury; but that the product was not defective since
it was accompanied by sufficient warnings notifying the user of the
product's potential hazards.
Finally, the continuing viability of the assumption of the risk de-
fense has been called into question by some courts. One court has
recognized that a worker's fear of losing his job is a form of economic
coercion sufficient to vitiate the defense of assumption of the risk. 192
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a decision that restricted the ap-
plicability of the assumption of the risk defense, raised the possibility
that the defense should not be permitted under any circumstances. 19 3
D. Product Misuse
Jurisdictions that have adopted strict liability as embodied in
section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts have generally rec-
ognized misuse or abnormal use of a product as a defense to a strict
liability action. 194 The key question in determining if a plaintiff's use
of a product was a "misuse" is whether the use to which the plaintiff
put the product was beyond a defendant's reasonable expectations of
192. See Johnson v. Clark Equipment Co., 547 P.2d 132 (Or. 1976). In Clark
Equipmenl, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized that fear of unemployment must
be considered in determining whether the risk was assumed. Id. at 140. The court
stated as follows:
For example, a worker might fear that a slowdown in his individual produc-
tion would slow down the entire production team and thereby draw the
attention of his boss. If he has a history of such slowdowns, or of causing
excess spoilage or ruining machine parts, he may have good cause to fear
dismissal. The job market could be tight, and he may have little hope of
being able to find a new job. Moreover, the situation may demand an im-
mediate, hurried decision. It is certainly possible that, under such circum-
stances, a reasonable jury could find that his decision to encounter a known
risk was not unreasonable.
Id. at 140-41.
193. See Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County, 496 Pa. 590, 437 A.2d 1198
(1981). Rutter was an action brought by a student against the school district for inju-
ries he suffered while participating in summer football practice. Id. at 594-95, 437
A.2d at 1200. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the school district's invoca-
tion of the assumption of risk defense, finding that the difficulties of the defense out-
weigh the benefits. Id. at 613, 437 A.2d at 1209. The plurality decision then
restricted the use of the defense by holding that "except where specifically preserved
by statute[,] or in cases of express assumption of risk, or cases brought under 402A,
. . . the doctrine of assumption of risk is abolished." Id. For a further discussion of
Rutter, see note 9 supra.
194. See Decorative Precast Stone Erectors, Inc. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 493 F.
Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (in Pennsylvania under § 402A, misuse can act as a super-
seding cause absolving the manufacturer of liability), affd sub nom. Bucyrus-Erie Co.
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 440 and 642 F.2d 441(3d Cir. 1981); Kuisis
v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 421, 319 A.2d 914 (1974) (manufacturer
not liable for defects caused by misuse of a product by its purchaser).
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the purpose for which the product was marketed. 95 Examples of
misuse may include knocking a bottle against a radiator to remove
the cap or adding too much salt to food. 196
The limitation that the misuse must be unforeseeable in order for
the defendant to be insulated from liability generally precludes the
applicability of the product misuse defense in a toxic tort situation.
Toxic torts, by their very definition, involve widespread use or expo-
sure to a particular substance. If a great many people are using or
being exposed in some peculiar fashion to a toxic substance, then a
strong argument can be made that the use to which large numbers of
people are putting the product is not a misuse. If a particular use of a
given product is widespread and the manufacturer considers that use
to be a misuse, the manufacturer should probably have foreseen this
usage of the product and taken precautions to prevent the product
from being used in such a fashion.
The product misuse defense is typically employed only in strict
liability actions. Although evidence of product misuse is sometimes
introduced in negligence actions, defense counsel will use that evi-
dence to construct a contributory negligence defense rather than
product misuse defense. Because a contributory negligence defense is
usually unavailable in strict liability actions, an astute defendant
would label evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent as "product misuse" evidence.
VI. EVIDENTIARY CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO TRIAL
STRATEGY
As noted previously, several defenses that are available in negli-
gence actions are unavailable in strict liability actions, and vice versa.
As such, plaintiffs may be forced to elect one cause of action over the
other. For example, in many jurisdictions, evidence that a defendant
complied with applicable codes, standards, or trade customs may not
be admissible in a strict liability action but often will be admissible in
a negligence action.1 97 Similarly, unless a claim for punitive damages
195. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965). Com-
ment h of § 402A states that a "product is not in a defective condition when it is safe
for normal handling and consumption .... The defective condition may arise not
only from harmful ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself either as to
presence or quantity, but also from foreign objects contained in the product, from
decay or deterioration before sale, or from the way in which the product is prepared
or packed." Id.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Holloway v. J.B. Systems, Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1979). Hol-
loway was a products liability action brought against the manufacturer of an alleg-
edly defective tank which injured worker-plaintiff. Id. at 1070. The Third Circuit, in
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is being pressed, evidence regarding a defendant's conduct in market-
ing a defective product is inadmissible in a strict liability action un-
less it has some bearing on the issue of whether the product was
defective. For these reasons, a plaintiff who has brought an action in
both negligence and strict liability must decide prior to trial whether
his case will be stronger if tried in negligence, in strict liability, or in
both. Many plaintiffs who bring actions in both negligence and strict
liability will drop their negligence action just prior to trial or at the
close of their case. They do so for several reasons. First, a plaintiff
may believe that the court's instructions to the jury on both negli-
gence and strict liability may confuse the jury as to the distinction
between the two different actions. Some plaintiffs do not want to risk
this confusion and therefore will drop their negligence claim since
their burden of proof in a negligence action is more difficult. Sec-
ondly, a plaintiff often does not want the jury to be instructed that
they must consider the degree to which the plaintiffs negligence con-
tributed to his injuries, which is something that the court must do if
the case is to be submitted to the jury under a negligence theory in a
comparative negligence state. And finally, a plaintiff may not want a
defendant to be able to introduce evidence to show the degree of care
that the defendant exercised in testing the safety of the product prior
to marketing it. A plaintiff in this situation may feel that, despite a
judge's instructions on the weight to be given to this evidence, the
introduction of such will inevitably strengthen a defendant's case.
However, a plaintiff will sometimes decide to retain both negli-
gence and strict liability claims in his action since some courts have
allowed a plaintiff to prevail on his negligence claim even if the strict
liability claim has failed. If a plaintiff submits his case under both
negligence and strict liability theories, the defendant has a golden op-
portunity to present certain evidence that can be highly favorable to
his case. For example, a defendant may be able to demonstrate to the
jury the degree to which the plaintiff contributed to his own injury.
Furthermore, the defendant may be able to introduce evidence show-
ing the degree of care that he exercised in testing the product's safety
prior to its sale. He may introduce evidence showing that his product
greatly exceeded general standards applicable to such products at the
time the product was sold. Finally, defense counsel can also contrast
the defendant's exercise of care in an attempt to avoid liability alto-
affirming the jury verdict for the manufacturer emphasized that "negligence con-
cepts such as 'trade custom' or 'reasonable care' have no place in suits brought under
§ 402A as that section has been interpreted by the Pennsylvania courts." Id. at 1073.
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gether. Evidence of a defendant's due care and a plaintiffs lack of
care can also be used to mitigate the size of the plaintiffs award.
VII. CONCLUSION
From the defendant's perspective, the most successful defenses in
the burgeoning area of toxic tort litigation are the statute of limita-
tions, medical causation, and product identification defenses. Be-
cause courts look upon toxic torts as a societal problem to be handled
within the framework of the existing tort system, decisions in this area
seem to rely heavily on public policy considerations.
Litigants, insurers, and attorneys alike198 have suggested, how-
ever, that there should be an alternative method of resolving these
disputes other than the traditional tort and jury trial system. Not
surprisingly, the focus of negotiations between the various committees
spawned by the Manville bankruptcy has centered on a non-judicial
solution to the asbestos puzzle. Similarly, proponents of uniform
product liability laws, 199 trade associations, and legal scholars are dili-
gently exploring other ways of resolving toxic tort claims. The judici-
ary, itself, has perceived a need for reform. For example, Judge Klein
of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas urged a review of the
existing system, stating:
[T]o put it bluntly, the present system just is not working.
The civil court calendar in Philadelphia cannot cope with
the volume of over 3,000 asbestos cases that have been filed.
Results of jury verdicts are capricious and uncertain. Sick
people and people who have died a terrible death from as-
bestos are being turned away from the courts, while people
with minimal injuries who may never suffer severe asbestos
disease are being awarded hundreds of thousands of dollars,
and even in excess of a milllion dollars.
The asbestos litigation often resembles the casinos sixty
miles east of Philadelphia more than a courtroom proce-
dure. And just as the casinos are the winners in Atlantic
City, the lawyers are the winners in asbestos litigation since
the costs of litigation far exceed benefits paid to claimants.
The Philadelphia court system has focused a great por-
tion of its civil resources on the asbestos litigation, devised
198. For a brief examination of some of the alternatives to litigation which have
been proposed for dealing with asbestos litigation, see Locks, Asbestos Litigation: Can
the Beast Be Tamed?, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1184, 1193-1207 (1983).
199. For a discussion regarding why such legislation is needed in the area of
toxic torts, see generally Schwartz & Means, supra note 2.
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methods of disposition of cases that have won national ac-
claim, and has processed record numbers of major civil
cases. But the new cases are filed faster than any court sys-
tem of Philadelphia's size can dispose of them.
Ideally, the federal or state legislatures should address
the problem. But even if legislation is enacted some time in
the future, it may not solve the problems of the thousands of
cases which have already been filed.
Since legislative remedies seem remote, the courts
should recognize that application of traditional tort law to
the "creeping disease" situation is often like trying to fit a
square peg into a round hole.2°°
It is obvious to all involved in toxic tort litigation that the present
method of handling toxic tort claims is less than adequate, and it is
equally obvious that other ways of coping with toxic tort injuries will
emerge in the years ahead. In the meantime, defendants should real-
ize that their time may be best spent preparing frontal assaults on
traditional toxic tort remedies.
200. See Blue v. Johns Manville Corp., No. 4001 (127), October Term 1978, slip
op. at 14-15 (C.P. Phila. October 12, 1980).
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